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When Edward Snowden became a household name m the
summer of 2013, a majority of Americans still viewed dragnetstyle surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) as an
acceptable means of combatting terrorism.' President George W.
Bush publicly acknowledged in 2005 that the NSA had been
conducting surveillance of ordinary Americans through the
unprecedented collection of individual phone records and emails
after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11).2 By
January of 2014, however, public opinion had shifted." For the
first time in history, Americans are grappling with the gravity of
our emerging surveillance state.
The American public has legitimate cause for alarm. Once the
stuff of "paranoid fantasy,"· the era of ubiquitous government
surveillance has arrived in large part due to the expansion of
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1 P EW Rt-:REARCH CTR., MAJORITY VIEWS NSA AS ACCEPTAHI.": ANTI-T ..:RROR TACTIC"
PUBLIC SAYS INVESTIGATE TERRORISM, EVEN IF IT INTRUDES ON PRiVACY (2013). Gllailahic at

http://www.people-prcss.orglfilesllegacy-pdfl06-10-13%20WP%20 SurveHl anceo 20Release.lldf.

(

2 Devlin Barrett, U.S. Declassifies Some Details of Bush-Era S urueillance: Obumn
Administration Still OpposPs Disclosure of Specifzcs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2013. http://olliin
e.wsj.com/news/artlcl('s/SBl0001424052702303773704579272121175326400; .Jnml!s Risen
& Eric Lichtblau, Blish Lets U.S. Sp:von Callers Without Courts, N.Y. T rMES, Dec. 15, 20U5,
http://www.nytimes.com/20051121161politicsl16program.html. The program was reportedly
discontinued in 2007. Dan Eggen, Omrl Will ()uerstP Wiretap Program, WASIl. POST, ,Jan.
18, 2007, at ADl, auailable at http://www.w8shingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentiarticlel2007/
Ol/1 7/AR200701 1701256.html; I~etter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., tn
Patrick Leahy, ChaIrman of the Comm. on the .Judiciary, and Arle n Specter, Ranking
Minority Member of the Comm. of the Judiciary (Jan 17, 2007), available at http://hosted.
ap.orgldynam ic/fi les/specials/in teractives/wdcJdocu mentS/fill alGonzaleh07 0 117 . pdf?S IT JI>:A

P&SECT ION=HOME.www.people-press.org/fiIesllegacy-pdfl06-10-13%20WP%20Surveillnn
ce%20Rl~lease.pdf.

:1

See HUsan Page, Poll: Most Americans Now Oppose the NSA Program, USA TODAY

(Jon. 20, 2014. 3:10 PM). http://www.usatoday.coml. tory/newsipoliticsl20 14/01l201po!l-ns...

surveillance/46:J85511 (finding that most Americans polled now mdicate their disapproval or
thn .6WCllping NSA survei1lance).
I See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A Exammes SoclUi Networks of U.S. CitizPIIS,
N.Y. T IMF.B, Sept. 29, 2013, at 22, auailable at http://www.nytimes.com/2013J09l29/uFJnsa-(.xn
minesosocial-networks·f)f-us-citizens.html?src=twrhp& r=0 (describing the extremity of lhl!
government intrusion); Dan FnlOkin, Top .Journalists and I.Alwyers: NSA Sllrllt'illa//c(~
Threatens Press Freedom alld Right 10 Council, T ilt: INTlmCI~I "I' (Julv 28. 2014, 9:a4 AM).
hll}J:llfi rstlook.orgltheinteITeptJ~nI4/07/2H1nsa-survei ll nncl!·threatens-pre ~ . {n'l,dmn-right''''1

unsel-survey-f'indsl (describing the actual mtrusion as "previomliy ('on!Jidcred the stull' of
paranoid fantasy").
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advanced technology and bulk data in private hands. 5 Gone are the
days in which cutting-edge clandestine surveillance was conducted
through direct-yet relatively exceptional-methods like courtordered wiretaps. The government now carries out much of its
surveillance by applying mathematical algorithms to huge sets of
data that customers willingly turn over to third-party sources such
as Verizon and Google. 6 Privately-sourced phone, e-mail, and IP
address information is then paired with so-called "enrichment data"
from Facebook, credit card companies, airline manifests, voter
registration rolls, GPS devices, aerial and closed-circuit camera
photos, 7 facial recognition systems," embedded microchips, 9 and
web-tracking technologies to create intimate personal dossiers of
unsuspecting individuals who have broken no laws.

[. See Obama's Speech on N.SA Surveillance, N.Y. T1MES, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.nytim
es.com/2014/01l181uslpoliticslobamas-speech·on-nsa-phone-surveillanee.html (acknowledging
tha t. technological advances, including those that facilitate bulk data gath(·ring by private
corporations, invite abuse of Americans' civil liberties if left unrestrained),
B See Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake & Greg Miller, Edward Snnwden Comes fhrward as
Source of NSA Leaks, WASH. POb.,., June 9, 2013, http://wWW.w8shingtonpost.comJpolitics/
intelligence-Iearders· push-back-on·Jeakers-media/2013106109/flf80160·d 122·1 e2'8 73e-826d299
ff459_st.ory.html (discussing the shocking revelation of Burveil1ancc program .. that collect. datn
from third-party sources such as Verizon); Timothy B. Lee, Here's Everything We Know About
PRISM to Da1.e, WASH. POST, June 12,2013. http://www.w8shingtonpost.comlblogslwonkblog/
wp/2013/061l2lheres-everything-we-know-nbou ~ -prism-to-datel (discussing how the NSA'",
PRISM program allows the NSA to coJlect data directly from the servers of Internet
companies).
7 See Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Eueryone in an Area lor
Several Hours at a Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.comlbusinessl
technology/new-surveillance-technology-can-track-everyone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-t
imel2014/02/05lB2fl556e·B76f·lle3·a5bd·B44629433ba3_slory.html (discussing state use of
aerial camera surveilJance).
II See Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity. Faceprints. and the Constitution, 21 GEO. MAsON L.
REV. 409,432-36 (2014) (describing facial recognition technology and its use); James Risen &
Laura Poitras, N.SA Collecting Millions of Faces from Web Images, N.Y. TIMES, June I, 2014,
at AI, aooilable at http://www.nytimes.oom/2014/06l01luslnsa-coUecting-millions-of-facesfrom-web-images.html (describing the NSA's expanding use of facial recognition technology for
surveillance); Naomi Wolf, The New Totalitarianism 0/ Surveillance Technology, THE
GUARDIAN. Aug. 15, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012Jaug/15/ncwtotalitarianism-surveillance-technology (discussing the use of facial recognition technology in
New York City); Natasha Singer, Never ForgeUing a Face, N.Y. TIMF.8, May 18, 2014, at BUl,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014J05/18/technology/never.forgettingaaface.html
(describing a scientific pioneer's misgivings with the trajectory of facial recognition
technology).
II See generally KATHERINE ALBRECHT & LIz McINTYRE, SPYCHIPS (plume 2006) (discussing
the impact of microchip technology on privacy).
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Such data insourcing1o for purposes of surveillance is of a piece
with the government's widespread practice of outsourcing
sovereign responsibilities to third parties through service contracts
and other devices that effectively transfer public power to private
hands. In both circumstances, existing law is not up to the task of
ensuring that government officials remain accountable to the
populace for sponsored activities. Statutory surveillance law and
Fourth Amendment doctrine were crafted in the pre-digital age,
when unconsented monitoring by the government was the greatest
threat to privacy. 11 Yet today, private industry parses and stores
personal information on a scale that is exponentially greater than
that which the government can aspire to on its own. 12 The
government capitalizes on such troves of private sector
1o Insourcing is typically used to describe "the use of government personnel to perform
functions that contractors have performed on behalf of federal agencies." KATE M. MANU!':!, &
JACK MASKELl., CONG. R&SF.ARCH SERV., R41810, INSOURCING FUNCTIONS PERmRMEJ> IW
FEDERAL CONTRAf'TONS: LEGAL ISSUES (2013), available at http:Jffas.orgfsgp/cra/misc/R418
lO.pdf. It has been promoted by recent Congresses as well as the Obama Administration in
response to concerns over outsourcing. /d. As used in this Article, "insourcing" refers to the
government's use of private sector data and lack of constitutional limitations that govern it. It
does not include information that private persons are required to provide the government by
law or regulation. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text {summarizing routine data
collection through tax returns and other incidents of citizenship). This Article does not discuss
The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (amended 2014), which is the primary legal authority
addressing the government's use and sharing of records but does not bind private parties or
restrict the government's ability to collect information from third parties. It provides that
agencies shall "collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject
individual when the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual's
rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs." /d. § 552a(e)(2). The Privacy Act
contains an exception for law enforcement activity. /d. § 552a(b){7).
11 See Neil M. Richards, 1'he Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. Rb"V. 1934, 1940
(2013) (observing that existing surveillance laws "focus(] on unconsented surveillance
rather than on surveillance as part of (a] transaction"); Thomas Y. Davies, Recouering the
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 620 (1999) C'(T]he historical sources
show that the Framers worded the search and seizure provisions as they did to counter the
possibility that legislators might authorize use of general warrants for customs searches of
houses ... .'1. In referring to privacy, this Article focuses less on information nondisclosure
and more on liberty or, as Anita Allen describes it, ~freedom from governmental or other
outside interference with decisionmaking and conduct, especiaUy respecting appropriately
private affairs." Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Priuacy, Private Choice, and Social
Contract Theory, 56 U. CJN. L. R~;v. 461, 464-66 (1987). For a discussion of the dangers of
ubiquitous surveillance, see Brown, supra note 8, at 434-36.
12 See Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Priuate-Public Intelligence Partnerships
in the War on Terror, 96 CAJ.IF. L. REV. 901, 902 (2008) (discussing how the private sector
has a "comparative advantage over the government in acquiring vast amounts of potentially
useful data").
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information for its own surveillance. \:1 It also hires private parties
for military combat operations, nuclear weapons management,
municipal policing, prison administration, policy planning am!
rulemaking, public benefits determinations, international
relations work, and its own personnel management. I •1
Because the Constitution only applies to state action,l. the
government's use of private sources to conduct its work evades
constitutional barriers that would otherwise operate to ensure
accountability to the people. 16 Outsourcing and data insourcing
occupy what amounts to a pocket of constitutional immunity as an
accident of doctrinal shortsightedness." Numerous scholars have
outlined legislative proposals for addressing private sector
involvement in government practices. I" This Article seeks to
13 PRul Ohm, The FOILrth Amendment in a Warld Without PrilJOCY, Al MJs.~. L.J. 1:l09.
1311. 1321-22 (2012) (discussing the govornment's increasing reliance on private
surveillanc~); Michaels, supra note 12, at 909 ("111f the government can convince private
husinesRes tD share their data collections, it can make An end-run around the more
I:ltringent restrictions limiting its ability to acceSB information directly,"),
I I Dan Guttman, Governance by Cmttract: Constillliional Visions; Time for Reflection and
Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321,323 (2004); see Michaels, supra note 12, at 902 (discussing
the extent to which the government relies on the private sector).
16 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) ("This court hnR ... constrlll'd
!Fourth Amendment] protection as proscribing only governmental action.").
III Sl'e Christopber Slobogjn, Gouernrnent Data Mining and the Fourth Amendllwtl/, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 317, 321 (2008) (observing that "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence appears to
leave data mining completely unregulated" and proposing a framework for interpreting lht·
doctrine to require limitations on government data mining); c{. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video
Suruei.l/ance and the Constitution. of Public Space: Fitting llU! Fourth Amendment 10 a World
'11101 Tracks Image and Identity. 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349. 1364-65 (2004) (arguin~ that .
ius lcnd o( protecting individual expectations of privacy, courts shou1d identify nnd protect.
lJublic SpacefO that allow privacy interests to exist).
11 C(. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globali.wlion. Democracy. and Iht' Nt¥!d {nr a NPIf'
Arlmitlislraliue I~w, 10 IND. J. GLOBAl. LEOAL S11)n. 125, 1:10 (20()3) (discutiNing huw
privRtiUltion of outsourcing creates a "democracy deficit" hy reducing transparency undl.'r
currl~nt policies).
114 SCI'. ('.g., id. at 151-54 (advocating for amendment of lh(~ Administrative Procedure Act
to l'nsurc proper accountability of government contractors Rnd private actors performing
government functions)i Anthony LaPlaca, Settling the Itlherently GOllernmelllai Functions
11·lmte OnCt' and for All: The Need {or CnmprchensiVt! l~g;slati(Jn of Private Security
Contractors in Afghanistan, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 745, 764 (2012) ("Congress should explicitly
preclude the Government from outsourcing certain functions by adopting binding legislation
that gives teeth to restrictions on private security contracting."); David Thaw, The Efficacy
uf Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. RF:v. 287, 370-71 (2014) (indicating that
cyhersecurity regulatory reform should include n comhination of "Management. Based
Hegulatory Delegation" and "directive regulation"); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger &
nl~irc1re K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and nn the C;round. 6:1 STAS. L. REV. 247, 311-15
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establish that, in spite of the many shortfalls in prevailing
doctrine, recognition of constitutional limits on the government's
use of insourcing and outsourcing to perform sovereign functions
is-or should be-inexorable. Such limits can be derived from the
Constitution's structure, which assumes that the government
remains ultimately accountable to the people for the exercise of its
functions. With an eye towards creative litigation, this Article
recasts state action, private delegation, and Fourth Amendment
doctrine in ways that enable judicial review of whether the
government has structured its outsourcing and data insourcing
relationships in ways that preserve constitutional accountability.
Part I describes the problem. Although governments have long
relied on private parties to perform their core functions, 19 the
practice in the United States today is so widespread that "[t]he
fact that some of what government does can be done better and
cheaper by the private sector has gained such momentum that the
public sector is sometimes seen as redundant or irrelevant."20 The
government conducts much of its surveillance using massive
amounts of the private sector's data.2t
Because private
22
corporations operate extra constitutionally, the net effect of the

es private parties
ns management,
cy planning and
s, international
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(2011) (making cautionary recommendattons for legislatures developing privacy law
reforms); rf Stan Soloway & Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context: What Dri!Jes It,
How to /mproue It, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 0UTSOUIWING AND AMEHJCAN
DEMOCRACY 192, 235-38 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (arguing for a greater

'

focus on government employees and contract workers, as opposed to increased legislation, to
improve government outsourcmg).
18 Guttman, supra note 14, at 323; Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose a11d Priuale Seruice:
The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the EuoliJin.g Law of Diffused
So1Jere1gnty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 863-64 (2000) (describing the evolution of privatized
government over the course of the twentieth century).
2ll Paul R. Vcrkuil, Public Law Limitations on Prwatization of CloiX!rnml!nt Functions, H4
N.C. L. REV. 397, 397 (2006). The primary rattonale supporting privatization-that private
market11 are more efficient and apolitical than government-is itself subject to sharp
debate. See, e.g., Matthew Tttolo, PriVatization and lhe Market Frame, 60 BUI-'F. L . REV.
493, 494 (2012) (providing a cnhcal examination "of those assumptions and suggest[ing}
that we abandon our baseline Vtew of privatization as efficient, neutral, and apolitical to
adopt a default view of privati:&ation as fraught with normative implications"); Sidney A.
Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 432 (2003) (''When the
government depends on private actors for regulatory functions, it has the cost of contracting
with those actors and monitoring their performance. These costs can exceed any cost
savings created by relying on private actors to perform regulatory functions.').
21 See Ohm, supra note 13, at 1322 (discussing the ~increasing reliance on technological
advances and private surveillance" by the government).
2~ See supra note 15.
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government's insourcing of privately sourced data and its
outsourcing of power to the private sector is a dilution of the
relevancy of the Constitution when it comes to ensuring
accountability to the public for the exercise of sovereign functions.
Part III describes the current legislative frameworks that apply
to federal outsourcing and data insourcing for government
surveillance, and explains how both fail to meaningfully limit the
government's ability to outsource public functions or adequately
control its access to private data for surveillance.'"
Part IV rev:iews the constitutional doctrine bearing on
privatization, which developed without a coherent framework for
testing alterations to the tripartite structure of government. As a
consequence, ad hoc case law under the state action doctrine, the
private delegation doctrine, and the Fourth Amendment has failed
to account for the myriad ways in which the private sector
infiltrates modern government, relying instead on the false
assumption that the public and private spheres can be treated as
distinct for purposes of constitutionallaw. 24
Part V argues that the merging of the public and private sectors
should instead be analyzed against a presumption of adherence to
constitutional structure that assumes-and thus requires as a
matter of first principles-that government is accountable to the
people."5 Recognizing that the law must evolve within existing
doctrine to the extent possible, this Article goes on to make a case

23 See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text (summarizing the deficiencies of the
current regulatory scheme),
:u See infra notes ~98. 335-38, 3~75 and accompanying text... FOT a discussion or
the First Amendment in the context of metadata surveillance, see Brown. supra note 8, at
449-55.
" See Akhil Reed Amar. Of Souereignty and Federalism, 96 YALe L.J. 1425, 1431-36
(1987) (contrasting the eighteenth-century British belief thot sovereignty was unlimited

and "resided in the [King)" with the American concept that "f{oyernment entities were
sovereign only in B limited and derivative sense, exercising authority only within
boundaries set by the sovereign Peoplej. But cf. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency. 549
U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (suggesting that the Constitution is a compromise between the
national government and the states, which ceded "sovereign prerogatives" to the former);
Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Con.stitutional Limitations on Privatization, 46
AM. J. COMPo L. 481, 482 (1998) (observing that some commentators view the Constitution
"as a blueprint for decision making processes, rather than 8S a guarantee of substantive
outcome" and emphasizing that "no clear consensus exists within the United States over
what functions are either properly or exclusively the government's" (citing Ronald A Cass,
i'riualizalion: Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449 (1988))).

2015]

'i

for recalibrat
Amendment
government c
outsources sm
third-party da
II.OUTSOUR

Although p:
familiar is the
party agrees tc
otherwise perf(
Traditional SE
implicates core

26 This Article doe:
circumstances. The
Article. Whereas lib
government account
promote the samo mE
H. Ginsburg & Steve
L. 251. 272 (2010) C'.
rule, much if not mo
Congress having vat
Priootualion. Public.
(2005) (discussing the
27 See generally J

BROKERS UNDERMIN

(discussing ways in .
often overshadOwing

full of holes").
211

See Jack M.

BeE

L.J. 1507, 1522- 25,
"contractls] out"); Pal
GOVERNMF..NT SRRVH

s

Priualizalicn Progel
form of the "rn arketiz.
t9

in

See Jody Freema

GOVERNMENT BY C

2 (noting how critict
security, and inte1lig
ability to ensure adh
(arguing that Borne 1
dele, ated to the priVE
to determine what rna

2015]

[Vol. 49:607

615

for recalibrating state action, private delegation, and Fourth
Amendment doctrine as potential tools for rendering the
government constitutionally accountable to the public when it
outsources sovereign functions to the private sector or insources
third-party data for use in its own surveillance activities,26

:lata and ita
lilution of the
to ensuring
ign functions.
lrks that apply
,r government
,fully limit the
or adequately

II. OUTSOURCING, DATA INSOURCING, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

e bearing on
framework for
'ernment. As a
m doctrine, the
ment has failed
private sector
l on the false
III be treated as
i private sectors
of adherence to
;; requires as a
~ountable to the
within existing
~ to make a case
t.he deficiencle~ of tho

or

(t. For n discussion
3rown, supra n ol l' 8, at

\L>: L .J. 1425, 1431- 36
~reignty was u nlimited

lernment. entities WNe

authority only within
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549
mpromise between the
Igntives" to the forme r) ;
on~ a ll Priuatizalion. 46
ra view the Constitution
uarantee of substantive
. the United States over
" (citing Ronald A. Cass,

I))).
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Although privatization takes many forms,27 perhaps the most
familiar is the traditional service contract, whereby a private thirdparty agrees to perform some function that the government would
otherwise perform for itself, such as routine building maintenance.'·
Traditional service contracting becomes problematic when it
implicates core government functions or individual civil liberties,29

~1I Thifl Article does not advocate for stronger constitutional boundaries on outsourcing in aU
circumsLances. The issue ho.s sharp political undertones that are beyond the scope of this
Article. Whereas liberals might seek to limlt outsourcing and insourcing in order to enhance
government accountability and preserve civil Hberties, for example, conservatives might
promote the same methods with the objective of shrinking the size of government. C{. Douglas
H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegatian and the Unitary Executiue, 12 U. PA. J. CONST.
J.. 251, 272 (2010) ("If the Congress had to vote on the Code of Federal Regulations rule by
rule, much if not most of it surely would fail. Yet those rules have the force of law without
Congress having voted at al1."). See generally Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability:
Prioatizal;"n, Public·"at;"n, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 111, 113-17
(2005) (chscussing the benefits and challenges of contracting out government work).
27 See generally JANIN~ R. WEDEL, SHADOW ELITE: How THE WORLD'S NEW POWER
BROKERS UNDERMIN" D EMOCRACY, GOVERNMENT, AND THE FREE MARKET 74-75 (2009)
(chscussing ways in which lOa hoat of nongovernmental players do the government's work,
often overshadowing government bureaucracy, which sometimes looks like Swiss cheese:
full of hol.s").
:pt See Jack M. Beermann, Priuatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1607, 1522-25, 1529-53 (2001) (discussing numerous ways in which the government
"contract[e) out"); Paul Seidenstat, The Mechanics of CAntracting Out, in CONTRACTING OUT
GOVENNMENT SERVICF_' 233-47 (Paul Seidenstat ed.. 1999) (88me); Jon D . Michaels,
Priuat1Zation's Progeny , 101 GloD. L.J . 1023, 1026-27 (2013) (discussing privatization in the
form of the "marketization of bureaucracy" and "government by bounty'').
29 See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates,
in GOVBRNMEN'r BY CONTRACT: OUTSOUHCING AND AMBRICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 18, at
2 (noting how critk s of government outsourcing worry that its expansion in military,
security. and intelhgence and policymak ing functions further restricts the government's
ability to ensure adherence to democratic norms); Verkuil, supra note 20, at 402, 420-32
(argu ing that. some dIscretionary, policymaking funct ions of government should not be
delegated to the private sector and suggestmg that the nondelegation doctrine can be used
to determine what may and may not be delegated).
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such as military operations on the battlefield,"o the drafting of
regulations,"' or management of nuclear weapons sites."" Other
forms of outsourcing include industry deregulation; the use of
vouchers;"" the divestiture of government assets to private parties;"'
and the infusion of market principles into the public sector by
curtailing collective bargaining rights of government employees or
converting civil service jobs to at-will positions. 3s Outsourcing has
received substantial scholarly attention because it challenges the
basic structure of government and the presumption that the public
and the private spheres are distinct. 36
Edward Snowden brought to the forefront of public
consciousness an inconspicuous manifestation of privatization: the
government's reliance on privately held personal data for
intelligence and law enforcement surveillance. 37 This practicewhich this Article calls "data insourcing"-is a form of outsourcing;
the government relies on private parties to perform a function
(intelligence· gathering) that it would otherwise provide
independently. Because the private sector is not bound by the
Constitution, it can collect private information with constitutional
impunity.3s In bootstrapping that data as its own, the government
30

See Denis Chamberland, Contractors on the Battlefield: Outsourcing of Military, NAT'I.

n";f<', MAn., Mar. 2011, available at http://www.nationaldefenscmagazine.org/nrchive/20111
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31 See Chris Sagers, The Myth 0/ "Privatization," 69 ADMIN. 1.... REV. :17. 45-46 (2007)
(noting that privatization writers have expressed concern about the privatization of
"seemingly inherent. government functions" like policymnking).
:l2 See Gene AJoise. U,s. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OrneR, GAO-1O-11fi, NATIONAl,
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33 Beermann, supra note 28, at 1519.
:14 ld.
ar. Michaels, .'wpra note 28, at 1026.
an See Paul Htarr. 7'he Meaning of Privatizat.ion, 6 YAU; L. & p(JI,'v RI~V, 6, 7 (1988) C'In
desperation some theorists announce that the distinction is outdated or so ideologically loaded
that it ought to be discarded, or that it is a distinction without a difference,"); Sagers, supra
note 31, at 56-57 (discussing the "line-drawing problem of the public·private distinction". For
a discussion of the benefit..c; of well·structured collaborations between the public and private
spheres, see generally JOHN D, DONAHUE & RICHARD J, ZECKHAUSER, COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE: PRIVA'fE ROLES FOR PuRI.JC GOALS IN TuRBULENT TIME...'; (2011),
37 See supra note 6.
aa See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text,
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insources the extra-constitutional norms that governed the
collection of that information in the first instance. As a result, the
government becomes less accountable to the people for its
surveillance practices and the Constitution is rendered largely
peripheral. The same effect occurs when a government agent
signs a contract transferring sovereign power to a private actor
who functions outside the boundaries of the Constitution.
Considered together, therefore, insourcing and outsourcing provide
a platform for pondering a broader constitutional architecture for
privatillation.
A OUTHOURCING 1'0 'fHIo: PRIVATI!: SKCTOR

The government has long relied on the private Sl.'Ctor to perform
tasks rangmg from public infrastructure development to
policymaking. a" But today, the government simply could not
function without private contractors. This is a consequence of
hiring caps on federal employees, a desire for flexibility, the need
for Hhort-term "surge capacity," and a lack of in-house expertise:")
From 2000-2014, the federal government paid over $6 trillion to
private contractors." They formulate federal policy, interpret
lawll, administer foreign aid, manage nuclear weapons sites,
The federal
interrogate detainees, and control borders.42
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r{~ s iclt' nt s m a territory, ngamst the wishes of the others"),
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government even hires private contractors to find and superVlse
other private contractors."
Private industry performs government intelligence functions on
an eye· popping scale."
Telecommunications companies have
granted "the NSA c~mplete access to their powerful switching
systems," built "classified communications networks for the NSA
and the Pentagon," and provided sophisticated "information
technology and analytical services to the NSA."45 Snowden's former
employer, Booz Allen Hamilton", advises the government on
operations coordination;47 border, cargo, and transportation
security;'" as well as intelligence, counterintelligence, and
counterterrorism,'9 with "more than 1,000 analysts working ... in
research, analyses, case investigation, and operational activities."'"
Academi-the company formerly known as Blackwater-has
received over a billion dollars in government contracts5l for tasks
ranging from tactics and weapons training for military, government,
and law enforcement agencies;52 to high-risk protection of sensitive
43 Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, National Security Inc., WASH. POST, July 20,2010, at
AS (noting that the Department of Homeland Security uses nineteen private 8taffin~
companies to help it find other private contractors).
44 See generally KATERI CARMOl..A, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOllS AND NEW WAR!->:
RISK, LAW, AND ETHICS (2010) (describing the structure of private military and security
companies, the assumptions that underlie their popularity. and how they might he
regulated),

~.j TIM SHORROCK, SPIES FOR

HIRE: THE SECRET WORLD OF INTEWG}o;NCE OUTI-;OlJllCINCl

305-08 (2008); see also D.vid A. Skl.nsky, The Priuatc Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165. 1177
(1999) (discussing the private contracting of security),
ott; John Bacon, Contractor Fire, Snowden (rom S122,OOO.a-ycar Job, USA TUllAY, June
Ii, 2013, hUp:llwww.usstoday.com/sotry/newslnationl2O 13106111lbooz·aJlen -snowden· lired12
4112311.
41 Government Managemenl, Booz ALLEN HAMILTON. http://www.boozallen.com/consulta
ntslcivilian.governmentlgovernment·management (18St visited Feb. 14,2015).
48 Homeland Security, Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, http://www.boozftlIen.com/consu)tantsiciv
ilian.governmentlhomeland.security-consulting 088t visited Feb. 14, 2015).
41 Law Enforcement, Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, http://boozallen.comlconsultantslcivilian·go
vcrnmenUlaw·enforcement·consulting (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
60 Jd. In 2012, "98% of the company's $5.9 billion in revenue came from U.S. government
contracts," and "[t]hree-fourths of its 25,000 employees (heidi government security
clearances." Bacon, supra note 46. For a detailed discussion of Booz Allen's deep influence
on "every aspect of national security, from the military to the highest reaches of national
intelligence," see SHORROCK, supra note 46, at 40, 38-71.
&I Editorial, Blcckwate,'s Rich Contracts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.
coml2007/10l03lopinionl03iht·edbl.ck.l.7733227.html.
6J See James Dao, Attack Thrns Spotlight on Private Security Firms. REG.-GUARD, Apr. 2,
2004. at A2 (noting that Navy SEALs and police units use Blackwater for training). See
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installations abroad, including CIA offices.· a After the 2012 attack
Oil the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, the budget for
t:he Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Diplomatic Security
hallooned to $2.7 billion for security protection plus $1.3 billion for
embassy security, constructioll, and maintenance.54 According to a
report of the Congressional Research Service, of the 36,000 people
employed by the Bureau, 90% are private contractors.55 In addition,
DOS employs 32,000 local guards under personal service
agreements or as subcontractors to ftrms under contract with the
federal government,be; enabling "the Executive [to) direct broad
swaths of intelligence policy without having to seek ex ante
authorization or submit to meaningful oversight."·7
Upwards of 480,000 federal contractors611 and nearly five million
federal employees have top-secret security clearances, which
private contractors are largely responsible for processing. 59 The
company USIS conducted clearances for Edward Snowden'"' and
Aaron Alexis, the Navy Yard shooter who obtained a secret·level
security clearance for his job with a government contractor in
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generally Blackwater Worldw ide, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/toplnewslbus iness/
companietUhlockwnter_usa/indcx.html (last vililo ited Feb. 14, 2015) (providing mdex of
articles about Blackwater),
53 See Mark Mazzetti, Blackwater Lases a .Job for the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11 ,2009, at
AB, oooilah/t at http://www.nytimes.comJ20091121121usfpolitic.sl12blackwater.html?ref=b lac
kwaterusa (difICuHSing a few examples of Blackwater's security contracts with the CIA).
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DIEGO, Aug. :iI, 201a, http://www.ut... nndiego.com/newsl2013lAug/31/private·security-contr
actors-military-role-under/3I?#article-copy,
511 See id. (noting that nine out. of ten are private contractors). This is a function of cost.
Outsourcing security at the U.S. Embas.!I.Y in Baghdad costa less than a tenth of what it would
cost the government to staff it directly. See id. (comparing $858 million to $78 million).
oM Jd.
67 Michaels, supra note 12, at 904; see also id. at 924, 926-27, 934 (explaining that
informally created intellh(ence relationships leave Congress unable to provide oversight).
M Mark Hosenban, &elusive: NSA Contractor Hired Snowdm Despite Concerns About
Re8ume Discrepancies, Rt;(f)'KHS (June 20, 2013, 8;52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/articlel
20 13106l21Iu.·u ••·security-.nowden·idUSBRE95K01J20130621.
.... See Jia Lynn Yang & Matea Gold, Contractor that Vetted Snowden Says II Also Ran
Background Check for Nauy Yard Shool", WASH. POST, Sept. 19,2013, http://articl••.wa.hing
tonpost.comJ2013·09-191businessl4221489J_Csecurity-c1earance·ulilis-background (noting that
USIS hondles 45% of all background checks for the Office of Personnel Management).
80 Dion Nissenbaum, Compan.y That Veiled Snowden Defends Work. WAlJ.. ST. J .. Aug. 28,
2013, httpJlonlin•.w.j.cominewsiarticle.lSB10001424127887324324404579041360132655752.
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2007.61 With 7,000 employees, USIS handles 45% of all
background checks ordered by the United States Office of
Personnel Management. 62 In October of 2013, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) joined a whistle-blower lawsuit alleging that USIS
violated the False Claims Act by automatically releasing
incomplete background checks and billing the U.S. government for
work it did not perform.6S
Perhaps unsurprisingly, outsourcing has been critiqued as
"paving the way for private contractors to abuse their discretion,
evade oversight, and generate unanticipated cost overruns.""' Jon
Michaels has argued that privatization strains the separation of
powers by affording the executive branch "greater unilateral
discretion-at the expense of the legislature, the judiciary, the
people, and successor administrations."66 Of course, privatization
is here to stay, regardless of its merits. And it is taking on new
forms that are more difficult for the public to identify and
question, let alone dismantle.
B. INSOURCING THROUGH PRIVATE SECTOR DATA ENHANC 'MENT

Before the rise of the Internet and big data, government
surveillance was conducted in real time by traditional methods
that involved fewer partnerships with the private sector than exist
today.66 With modern data mining, the latter form of intelligence

Yang & Gold. supra note 59. Alexis was an inform ation technology contractor for The
Experts, Inc., a subcontractor to Hewlett-Packard, which was under contract with the Navy
and Marine Corps to update and replace technology at numerous military installations.
Carol D. Leonnig, Mates Gold & Tom Hamburger, Military's Background Check System
II

Failed to Block Gunman with a History of Arrest.. WASH. POb'T. Sept. 17. 2013. http://
articles. w88hingtonpost.com/20 13-09-17/pohtice!42132 771_1_sccuri ty -cloarance -mil itary-cD
ntractor-installations.
62 Yang & Gold, supra note 59.

Evan Perez, Justice Department Joins Lawsuit on Q:Jmpan.y~ Background Chf"Cks,
CNN (Oct. 30, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/201 3/1O/30/usicontractor-hackground-ch
ecks-Iawsuitl.
a. Jon D. Michae ls, Privatization's Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717. 718 (2010) (citing
Freeman & Minow, supra note 29. in GOVERNMF.NT RV C ON1'RACT: OlfI'SOllR('1 NG AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. supra note 18, at 1-6).
" Id. at 719.
(06 }o'~r R discuss ion of historical clandestine surveillance techniques, from " 'mobile
surveillance,'" which is "conducted prima rily by foot. automobile, or airpJAnl''' to "track ( I a
person or other moving target." to "more exot.ic sys tem s" developed in the late twentleth63
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gathering-third party sourcing-is eclipsing the former. Because
constitutional jurisprudence and existing legislative accountability
schemes evolved to address traditional methods, they are a poor fit
for the privacy challenges posed by modern surveillance through
big data mining.67
1. Gouernment Surueillance Through the Twentieth Century. In
early colonial history, little was done by way of government
surveillance. 6M Most communities relied on lay members to keep
order.09 In the seventeenth century, the king or the governor
appointed sheriffs for larger populations.70 Because they charged
fees for their work, sheriffs focused on income-generating activities
such as tax collection, serving subpoenas, and operating the jail,
rather than on law enforcement. 71 Their activities were primarily
reactive-they addressed problems in response to complaints
rather than preventing or investigating crime. 72
Government surveillance did not begin in earnest until the
nineteenth century, when American cities faced increased crime
from population growth, ethnic and racial tensions, and economic
failures.7,. In 1861, Abraham Lincoln appointed the first secret
service agent, a private detective who went on to institutionalize
the practice of profiling criminals using posters and photographs
during the Civil War.74 Although technology was limited at that
time, the invention of the telegraph in 1844 and the telephone in

century. see RORI:R'I' WAI.LACE & H. K~;ITH M £LTON. SPYCRAFT; THE SECRIlT HIsroRY OF
THE CIA'~ SPYTECHS FROM CoMMUNISM TO AL·QAEDA 401-02. 416 (2008).
If See Slobogin, supra note 16. at 321 ("Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
appears to leave dats mining completely unregulaLed ... ,It).
611 See infra note 73 and accompanying text (noting that government aurvei1lance hegan
in the nineteenth century),
!IV See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHM RNT IN AM"~RICAN Hn'''1'ORY 6H (1993)
(''The creation of police forces was another landmark ... in the long, slow retl't'at of lay

j U8ti~.").
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I in the late twentieth·

1'0 James GeiHtman, Sheriffs, in THI-: SociAl, HISTORY ell<' CRIMfo! ANn PUN1HHMt.:N'f 1N
AMERICA: AN ENCYCJ.OPf:D1A 16S.~ (Wilhur R. Miller ed .• 20 12).
11 Id.; Craig n. Uchldn, Hi..<;tory of Aml'ru'on PolirinR. In 1 Tm: gNC:YI:1.0PlmJA OF P()I.I N~

SCllm",,; ($17 (.Jack R. Greene ed., 3d ,·d. 2007).
7t UchidA, Hupra nole 71.
73 CHRISTIAN PARlmTI. TIm SOl..,. GAm;: RUHVEI I.LANC Jo; IN AM ";R II~A FROM SI..AV gRY TO
'fHJo; WI\R ON 1'~:RROH :1fi-86 (200:l); Uch irla, sl/pra not e 7 1, Rt fH7- 1R (des(!ri hing t he
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14 J .K.

PIITlmS ~:N. HANlllKJOK ()to' HUIlVJm.l.AN('K 'rl~(·IINOI.C)( lH~~

:lIt (:ld 1'41. 2(12).

622

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:607

1876 made surveillance easier.75
Investigators used simple
telescopes or bribed telephone and telegraph operators to
eavesdrop.7s With the advent of the hand-held camera in 1884,
photography became a more accessible surveillance tool. 77 The use
of mug shots, body measurements, and police files for
identification purposes-a method called "Bertillonage" after its
French inventor, Alphonse Bertillon-evolved and spread. 7s
By the early 1900s, the federal government used secret
operatives, including private organizations, to conduct
investigations. 7• Federal and state law enforcement authorities
began compiling fingerprint repositories. BO
The Bureau of
Investigations-now the FBI-became an official part of the
Department of Justice."! The federal government began collecting
personal financial information and other data on tax returns. 82
During World War I, surveillance technologies such as codebreakers, magnifying devices, and submarines equipped with
airship detection equipment were deployed to protect national
interests. 83 Mter the war, law enforcement began to rely heavily
on wiretapping to monitor social unrest. 84
711

DANIEL

J. SOLOVE, MARc ROTENHEIUJ & PAUL M. SGJ-IWAU'f'Z, PIUVAGY, INFORMATION.
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n See Susan W. Brenner, TIu! Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75
MISS. L.J. I, 32-33 (2005) (noting how the hand· held camera made eavesdroppin~ Himple
and popular); PARENTI, supra note 73, at 3~38 (discussing law enforcement's use of
photographs in the nineteenth century).
111 PARENTI, supra note 73, at 43-45.
79 PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 30; JENNIFER FRONC, NEW YORK UNll&KCOVER: PRIVATI<!
SURVElLlANCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 146 (2009) ("During the war, 88 8 consequence of
and in response to the weakness of federal police mechanisms. private organizations were
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8J PARENTI, supra note 73, at 51-53; PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 30.
81 Pf:l'ERSEN. supra note 74, at 30.
It2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shaH have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment. among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."); see also I.R.C. § 601 (1970)
(repealed 1976) (giving tax deductions to bank affiliates). Law enforcement access to tax
record. i. limited. See I.R.C. § 6103(d)(I) (2012) (anowing disclosure to enforce tax laws);
id. § 6103(h)(4)(D). (i)(I)(A) (authorizing disclosure by court order).
II.l PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 30-31.
~ SOLOVE, RoTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 75, at 64; see Erin Murphy, The Politics
of Priuac:y in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment,
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During the 1930s and the 1940s, the government expanded
routine collection of data on American citizens.8s The first social
security number was issued through the U.S. Postal Service in
1936,"" and became linked to property ownership, residence
histories, medical records, and other public transactions that the
government could use to profile individuals. 87 During World War
II, Western Union forwarded all international cables to United
States intelligence personnel.1I8 The National Security Council and
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were created to handle
national security and intelligence matters.89 The FBI's jurisdiction
was extended to include background checks offederal employees.!IO
In the 1950s, television, radio, and telephone technology
improved substantially."1 State and local government agents
routinely eavesdropped on unsuspecting subjects-often in
cooperation with local phone companies."
Physicists and
astronomers developed knowledge that was later applied to
orbiting satellite technology.93 Under President Truman, national
responsibility for communications intelligence shifted to the NSA,
and surveillance policies were revised to address the Cold War
threat of communist expansion."' The CIA, at the direction of
President Eisenhower, contracted with Lockheed Corporation,
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Wid Statulury l ..ulV Bn{orctlUent Exemptions, III MICH. J~ REV. 485, 503 n.72 (2013) (noting
LhH.llhl! "law uuLlawing wiretapping" expired at. the end of World War J). For a discussion
of wiretnp legislation, see infra Part In and SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note

75, at 83-91.
"" See infra notes K6-90 nnd llct.'ompanying text.
",I Social Security Numbers, SOCIAL SECURITY, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssnlfirstcard.
html (Ial!t visited ~'eb, 15, 2015).
117 Set' PARKNTt, supra note 73, at 84-87 (explaining the development of the social security
sysLcm nnel how linking persunal information to social security numbers quietly reduced
Americans' privacy); William H. Minor, Identity Cards and Dalabases in Health Care: The
Net!d fv, F.d.rat Prioory Praterlions, 28 COWM • •1.1. & Soc. PROS.". 253. 26(}.$ (1995)
(discussing the development of the social security system and the privacy concerns it creates).
l1li Michaels, supra note 12, at 914. See generally THOMAS F. TROY, DONOVAN AND THK
CIA: A HI!l'l'ORY llF 'I'H>: ES'l'ARI.I!lHM':N1' OF THE CENTRAl. INTE!,I.IGENCE AGENCY (1981)
(detailing the history of the CIA through the post-World War II years).
1111 PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 36.
110 Id.
III Id. at 39.
91 Susan Freiwald, Online Sur~iIIanC'e: Remembering the Lessol1S of the Wiretap Act, 56
AIoA. L. R.;v. 9. 12 (2004) (citing SAMUEl. DASH F.T AI.., THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959».
as Ph"1'KK.."iEN, supra note 74, at 37.
" Id. at 38.
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General Electric, Eastman Kodak, and other companies to build
spy planes and other technologies with unprecedented surveillance
capabilities "that could see behind the Iron Curtain to measure the
strength of Soviet military forces and detect preparations for a
surprise attack."9&
In the 1960s, civil rights turbulence, increased use of
recreational drugs, and fear of nuclear proliferation fueled public
demand for enhanced foreign and domestic surveillance. 9s Night
vision devices enabled long-range military surveillance,97 aerial
mapping cameras allowed for preClSIOn topographical
photography,98 and infrared sensors evolved. 99 The CIA developed
the capacity to build 3D models of foreign terrain, buildings, and
weapons using surveillance photos and intelligence data. 1011 Bar
codes were in regular use by 1967. 101
In the 1970s, the Watergate scandal made illegal investigative
surveillance and wiretapping a headline issue.1U2 The Director of
the NSA admitted to Congress in 1975 that the agency
"systematically intercepts international communications, both
voice and cable," and acknowledged that domestic conversations
were captured incidentally, as well. lOa Documents disclosed in
2013 by Edward Snowden reveal that global communications
providers began voluntarily handing over customer data to the
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national security).
97 Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation. of the Value and MeaTUJ Moo~ls (Jf the Fourlh
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678 & n.162 (1988).
011 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 242 & 0.4 (l9R6) (dL'f\r.rihing
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government in the 1970s, often for hefty fees.!" The first
commercially viable personal computer was introduced in 1975.10'
Computer hackers emerged with the expertise to overtly break
into others' computers, including government systems. illS
Magnetic strip technology became readily available for credit card
use, and by 1972 u a fully operational network of interconnected
computer databanks" was under development in order to "facilitate
almost instant credit and background checks."l07 Marketers
discovered that data from white and yellow pages, driver's license
records, and voter registration cards could be compiled, bought,
and sold. 1OB
The Internet evolved in the 1980s as a medium for military
communications amongst a finite group of government, academic,
and computer professionals. 109 Mter a suicide bomb attack in 1983
left 241 Marines dead in Beirut, the Reagan Administration coined
a new phrase, "war against terrorism."1I1l The Internet's rapid
circulation of information enabled unprecedented opportunities for
collaboration amongst law enforcement entities and increased
public scr utiny of government surveillance activities, which
expanded through the 1990s. l11
By the mid-1990s, private organizations such as museums,
service stations, department stores, grocery stores, and schools
routinely installed motion detectors and visual surveillance
systems. 11 2 Digital camcorders and global positioning systems
came on the commercial market.1l3 Government began to rely
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un technological developments from the commercial
sect.ol' lor its own surveillance.1I4
2. Twenty-First Century Surveillance and the Private Sector.
The first decade of the twenty-first century saw additional growth
in computerized communication, with a shift towards a global
economy based on the collection, sharing, and analysis of infinite
amounts of information. 1I5 The transition from analog to digital
technology in 2009116 meant that telephone communications were
no longer conducted on dedicated paths between two parties.
Multiple communications could instead occur on a single line by
breaking them down into pieces-or "packets"-and reassembling
them at the destination.1I7 These "digital trail[sJ"lIK of activity
could be stored relatively cheaply.1I9
As a consequence,
government monitoring became "less about analog surveillance
and more a matter of 'data mining.' " 120
Today, the amount of globally available data is staggering.
Phone companies, social networking and dating sites, online
retailers, Internet service providers, publicly available satellite
systems, financial institutions, and credit agencies collectively
possess "trillions if not quadrillions-plus bits of information," much
of it voluntarily disclosed by individuals as a condition to using a
product or service. 121 A CNN reporter bluntly described the data
trail created by logging onto the Internet each day:
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114 Richards. supra note 11, at 1958 ("One of the most significant changes that the aliCe of
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l1ri Sec ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE FUTURE (W
PEOPJ.E, NATIONS AND BUSINESS 4 (2013) \In the first decade of the twenty·first century the

number of people connected to the Internet worldwide increased from 350 million to more
than 2 bi1lion. In the same period, the number at mobile·pbone subscribers rose from 750
million to well over 6 billion (it is now over 6 billion).").
116 See Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109·171,
§§ 3001-3009. 120 Stat. 4, 21-27 (2006) (terminating all licenses and requiring the
cessation ofbroadc8sting by full·power stations in the anaJog television service8).
m PATRICIA MOLONEY F1GlJOLA. RESEARCH SERVo RL30677, DIGITAL SURVElJ.J.ANCE: THE
CoMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT ACT 2 (2008).
1111
Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the DigiJ.al Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH.

wm

L.J.

283, 292 (2003).
1111 Orin S. Kerr. The Nert Generation Communications Privacy Act. 162 U. PA. L. REV.
373,37:;"'76 (2014).
no DeVries. supra note 118, at 292.
'" Frida Ohitis. Googk Knows Too Much About You. CNN (Feb. 9. 2012. 2 :58 PM). http://
www.cnn.coml2012102109/opinionighitis·google·privacy/.
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Google has every e-mail you ever sent or received on
Gmail. It has every search you ever made, the
contents of every chat you ever had over Google Talk.
It holds a record of every telephone conversation you
had using Google Voice, it knows every Google Alert
you've set up. It has your Google Calendar with all
content going back as far as you've used it, including
everything you've done every day since then. It knows
your contact list with all the information you may have
included about yourself and the people you know. It
has your Picasa pictures, your news page
configuration, indicating what topics you're most
interested in. And so on.
lf you ever used Google while logged in to your
account to search for a person, a symptom, a medical
side effect, a political idea; if you ever gossiped using
one of Google's services, all of this is on Google's
servers.
And thanks to the magic of Google's
algorithms, it is easy to sift through the information
because Google search works like a charm. Google can
even track searches on your computer when you're not
logged in for up to six months. '22

:n the commercial
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The government has tapped into private corporations'
gargantuan storehouses of data for years.'23 Under a secret
executive order issued by President George W. Bush after 9/11,
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Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
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In Id.; see also DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE SToRY OF THE
CoMPANY THAT Is CONNECTING THE WORLD 323-28 (2010) (comparing Google with Facebook,
which it describes as having a "vision of providing a universal identity system for everyone on
the Internet'). See generally STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS WORKS AND
SHAPV..8 OUR LIVES 315-67 (2011) (discuaaing Google's influence on America~ politi~ and
government); SIVA VAlDHYANATHAN, THE GoociLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE
SHOULD WORRY) 3-4 (2011) (discussmg Goagle's gJobal impact and negative effects on Mthe

pursuit of global civic responsibility and the public good'112.1 See DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE: How OUR SEARCH FOR SAF~"I'Y
INVADES OUR LIBERTIES 247 (2011) ("Most personal electronic information is in private
hands, and savvy entrepreneurs manage it for profit by selling the data to retailers of all
stripes. The government can buy 1t, too, and since 9/11 various proposals for using it have
generated 8 blizzard of collection programs."); Ohm, supra note 13. at 1324-25 (observing
that data minmg has muted traditional surveillance methods like court-ordcred wiretaps
and physically tailing suspects); Richards, supra note II, at 1940-41 (discussing the
complex entanglement between government surveillance and private business).

628

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:607

telecommunications companies such as AT&T, Verizon, and
BellSouth granted senior NSA officials' oral requests for
warrantless access to switches carrying domestic telephone calls,
which led to the creation of a massive database of information
regarding individual calling habits. 124 Much of the government's
data now comes from large-scale commercial data brokers such as
Thompson Reuters' CLEAR125 and LexisNexis' Accurint l26 that
collect information from private sources for government
purchase. '27 A 2008 report by the United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) stated that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), DOJ, DOS, and the Social Security
Administration "used personal information obtained from [suchl
resellers for ... criminal investigations, locating witnesses and
fugitives, researching assets held by individuals of interest, and
detecting prescription drug fraud" at a cost of approximately $30
million that year. 128 The purchased information included "birth

l!H Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2; ~81ie Caull!Y, NHA flus Massive /Jatabase of
Americons' PhOM Calls, USA TODAY (Mny 11. 2006. 10::lR AM), http://m~ntodlly30.tlAAlU
day.com/newslw8shingtonl2006.05-10-ns8_x.htm.
125 CLEAR, https:Jlc1ear.thomsonreuwrs.comicleuf_homclgovcrllJlIcnl.htm# (hlHt visitl'd Jo'(!h.
15.2015).

I'ltl LF.XIS NEXIS, hUp:llwww.lexislluxiH.cnm/guwrnmtmth.olulinnFiinvcstig:ntiVl'/ol'Curinl.(U,l'x

(lust visited Feb. 15,2015).
1:!1 Michaels, supra note 12, at 9Ui; see also Duvid Gray, Unuiell{' K('(lb; Citron & Liz
('lark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime Afur United StateN v. Jont>,S. 103 J. CIUM. I .. &
('KIMINOIA)(W 745. 7R5 (2013) rrSJocial networking siLes. merrhnnts, and data hn,hrR
l'l!(:ord and analyze our digital footprints ,fur immediate commercial gain
Som{~
packuttt· the information into 'digital dossiers,' which they sell tu J,tuvcl'nmcnl nnd prJvnte
clients. Law enforcement and other government officials routinely contrm:t with theSl" dntn
bruk(!l'R or directly request or Bubpoena information about our oolino uctivltje~ rrom ISP,.. ('muil JlruvidcrH, nnd search engines." (citing DANIEL J. SOLOVF.. 'rlIg Dlw'rAI. P";lt,';()N:
'l'F.CUNOr.OflV ANlJ PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION ACtio! 2 (2004))): Rrllcc &h,wi(·r. Do You
Wont the Govemmenl nflying Your Data from Corporatwns? TH"; A'rI.AN'J'H' (Apr. ao, 2013,
1:25 PM), ht.t p:/lwww.theat1antic.com/technololO./archi vel2D 1a/04/du-ynu. Wit nt •the ·gownlln
(mt-h\lying-your·dftta·from-corporationsl2754~lJ ("Sometimros [guv(>Mlment ngen('ies] similly
purcha:\C 'privately·hl~ld data] , just a8 any other company might.").
0
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0
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ollGilahi, at http://www.gao.gov/Rssctsl120/11929R.pdf. The term "r(·Rl·ll('rs" rl'rer~ to
"businesses that vary in many ways but have in common collecting nnd aggregating
personal inrormation from mUltiple Rources and makmg it avadahlc to tht·ir cu"tomprs." Id.
at 5. The National Counterterrorism Center-which is part of the Office or the Dire('tor of
National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, OFFICfo; OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIO!llAL I~'TEl.LlGENCE, http://www.dni.govlindex.phplaboutlorganizationlnational-rount.e
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l'lm'roriMm-('(>nl.er-who-we·are ()ORt visited Feb. 15, 2015)-uses such data for surveillance,
as well. Cray. Citron & Rinehart, supra note 127, at 786.
1:tV U.S. Gov'" AeC()UNTAlm~I'l'Y O}o'Jo'fCJo;. GAO.OB.543T, supra note 134, ut 6 (footnote
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and death records, property records, motor vehicle and voter
rCb>istrations, criminal records, and civil case fIles, , , telephone
directories, business directories, classified ads or magazines,
Internet sites, and other sources accessible by the general public"
but not readily available, as well as "[n]onpublic information
derived from proprietary or nonpublic sources, such as credit
header data, product warranty registrations, and other application
information provided to private businesses directly by
consumers."'29 The government also accesses a network of over
sixty "fusion centers" developed after the 9/11 attacks, which share
intelligence information amongst local, state, and federal law
enforcement as well as private contractors, '30
Until recently, the NSA's surveillance programs collected two
types of privately-sourced data, which the agency then mines for
patterns and trends,m The first is metadata, which "includes
highly revealing information about the times, places, devices and
participants in electronic communication, but not its contents,"'3.
The FOI'eign Intelligence Surveillance Court's '3.1 Verizon order,
made public in June of 2013, covered this kind of data-the socalled "envelope" of a customer phone call, including the date and

Verizon, and
l requests for
telephone calls,
, of information
1e government's
brokers such as
Accurint l2B that
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omitted) .
lau Statt! and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, U .S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
~~;GURITY. hUp:Jlwww,dhs.gov/atat.e-and-ffiajor-urban-area-fusion-centers (last visited Feb.
15, 21ll 5). A 2012 repnrt by a congressional subcommittee assailed them 8S "'pools of
Ineptitude. waste and civil hberties intrusions," according to one journalist. Robert
O'Harrow, Jy .. J)HS "/<'usion Cenler,," Porlrayed as Pools of ineptitude and Civil Liberties
Intrusions, WASH. Po~, Oct. 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigationsldhs-fu
Kiun-(~enttH'purll'ayed-us- poolj,j-of- i Ileptilude-and-civil-li hertiutl-in trusionsJ20 12/1 010211 00 144
40·()cbl·lle2·hdla·h868e65d57eb_story.html.
1:11 See Burton Gellman. U.s. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Reuealing
Internet, Phone Meladala, WASH. Posr. June 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.comiinvest
igntionshls-surveillam:e-arthitecturc-includes-collection-of-revealing-internet-phone-metadatD.1
201 :J/Oflll rwcHhfO04n-d51 1- 1 le2-b05f-3ea3COe7bb6a_story.html (describing two collection
programK fOT metadata and two collection programs for content).
1J2 [d. See generall.y PATRICIA MOWNEY FIGIOLA, RESEARCH SERVo RL30677, DJGITAl.
SURV,m,I.ANe>:: TH>: COMMUN'CATIONS A.... 'STANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT 1-2 (2008)
(explaining that modern technology hos blurred the traditional distinction between the
interception of communication content and the acquisition oC identification information).
13.1 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is established by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885 (2012); see id. § 1803 (establishing the
court).
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time of a call, its duration, the telephone numbers involved, and
location of the participants. ,a4
The second type of NSA data collection involves the content of
communications. '3 • Also in June of 2013, the press revealed that
the government through the PRISM program was "tapping directly
into the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies,
extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e·mails,
documents, and connection logs that enable analysts to track" a
person's movements and contacts over time."6 It was later
reported that the NSA has also collected "upstream" Internet
data,'37 which is traffic sent from a computer or network-such as
uploaded files or muItiplayer game data in real time-as distinct
from "downstream" data received by a computer or network. I:IIC
l,l.l Glenn GreenwaJd, NSA Collecting Ph.one Rf'rords of Millions of Verw m Cll~tom('rs
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 7:04 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/woridlinteraci
ive/2013/junl06/verizon.telephone-data-court.order.
1311 See supra. note 131 and accompanying text.
las Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Milling IJata {rom Nint U.•"",
ln1crnet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. Po•.,.,.. June 7, 2013, at At , A1 2, oooilable
at ht.tp:l/www.w8shingtonposLcomiinvestigationsJu8·intelligence-mining-data-from·nine-us·in
t.emet-comparues.in.braod.secret-program-2013l06l06l3aOcOda8.cebf.l1e2.8845·d970C(:h04497
_story.html; Glen Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to lTsC'r lJnta of
Apple, GooNle and Others. THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 3:23 PM). http://www.the RUardian.
rom/worldJ20131junlO6lus-tech-giants.nsa-data.
137 Laura K. Donohue, SectUm. 702 and the CoUection of Internalwllal Teiephonf> omlln lernf!1
Q,ntent, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL"\' 117. 120 (2014) (CIting Jnmes Ball. N.'iA:, Prism
Surveillance Program: How It Works and What It Can. Do, THE GUARDIAN (Junu 8, 2013, 1:56
PM), http;l/www.theguardian.com/worldl2013JjunJ08lnsa-prism -scrver-collection-racebook-goo
g)e); FISC Ct.• Mem. Op. & Order, at 30 (Oct. 3. 2011). available at https:/Iwww.ncill.urg/fllesl
assetsifisc_opinion_lO.3.2011.pdf.
The Obama Administration publicly confirmed the
existence or both programs. See Press Release, Shawn Turner, Dlr. or Pub. Affairs. Office or
the Dir. or Nat1 Intelligence, ON! Declassifies Intelligence Community Tlocuments Regarding
CoHectlon Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligenc£" SurvClUanrR Act (FISA) (Aug. 21,
2013), aooilable at http://www.dni.gov/index.phplnewsroomlpress-releasesl191-pre88-releases20131915-dni-decJsssifies-intelligence-community-documents-regarding-coUectlon-under-sectl
on-702-of-the-roreign-intelligenceosurveillance-act-fisa C'President Ohama requested that til('
[NSA] declassify and make public as much inrormation a8 possible about certain sensitive
NSA programs .. .."J.
1311 DoUGI.AR
DOWNING, MlrHAEI. COVINGTON & MIo:J.oOY MAULDIN COVINGTON,
DICTIONARY OF CoMPUTER /.NU INTERN~'T TERMS 154. 535 (9th ed. 2006). Orin Kerr draw.
the distinction between prospective surveillance-the "capture [of] future communicatIOn!"
that have not yet been sent over the network," such as wiretapping-and retrospective
surveillance. where the govemment looks for past communications that are stored in a
network. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surueillance Law After the USA Patriot AcL' The Hil:
Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 616 (2003). He aJso characterizes this distmction
as direct versus indirect surveillance. Id. at 621.
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Donohue, supra note 137, at 121.
Timberg & Gellman, supra note 104. Several companies that have provided
information to the NSA under PRISM reported to tho Washington Post that they do not
accept money for doing so. Id.
HI Id.; see also Robert Lenzner, A7T, Verizon. Sprint Are Paid Casl, by NSA for Your
Privale Communications, FORBES, Sept. 23, 2013, hup:Jlwww.Corbes.comJsitesirobertlenzn
er/20 13109/231 a tt verizonsprint·are-paid-cash ·by-nss -for -your-pri vate-comm unica tions! ("The
[NSA) paya AT&T, Verizon. and S print Beveral hundred million dollars a year for access to
81% of all international phone calls into the US, according to (the Snowden disclosures}:,.
Many of these agreements are authorized by the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012). See generally infra note. 197, 241-44 and
accompanying text.
l oti Steve Chenevey, PRISM' Barach Obama Says 'Nobody Is Listening ro Your 7'elephone
Calls,' AssOClATED PRESS, June 7, 2013. http://www.wjla.comJarticlesl2013106Jprism.barac
k-obama-says.nobody-is-listening-to.your-telephone-caUs.-89818.html.
143 See Rajeev Ronanki & David Steier, Cognitiue Analystics, in TECH TRENDS 2014:
INSPIRING DISRUPrlON 19,2 1 (2014). auai/able at http://d2mtr37y39tpbu.cloudfront.netlwp-con
tentJuploadal2014/02ITech.Trend• •2014]INAL-ELECTRONlC_.ingle.2.24.pdf (classifying
machine learning 8 S one of three kinds of cognitive analytics).
.
144 Steven M. Bellovin, Renee M. Hutchins, Tony Jebars & Sebastian Zimmeck, When
Enough I, Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and Machine Leamine, 8 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 556, 590-91 (20 14) (providing a scientific explanation of machine learning).
14 ,\ See Michael Hickins, U.S. News: How the NSA Could Get So Smart &1 Fast--Modcrn
Computing Is Helping Companies and Governments Accurately Parse Vast Amounts of Data
in a Matter of Minutes, WAU . ST. J., June 12, 201 3, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com
InewaiarticlealSB10001424127887324049504578541271020665666 (explaining how the NSA
can now efficiently parse quantities of data that were unimaginable five years ago);
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, LIQUID SURVEIl.IANCE: A CONVERSATION 5-6 (2013)
l3i

,ining·data-from·nin~·u8-in

James Ball, NSA's Prism
·AROIAN (June 8, 20la, 1:56
rver-collection-facebook·goo

631

The NSA amassed more than 13,25 million upstream transactions
in the first six months of 2011,'"9 In exchange for the data. it paid
U.S. companies a total of $394 million dollars that fiscal year. l4O
According to one telecommunications executive. these "voluntary
agreements simplify the government's access to surveillance."I.1
The NSA's computers analyze the information it collects for
suspicious patterns and so-called "communities of interest"people in contact with persons of interest overseas,l.2 Although
traditional database systems required analysts to build and
rebuild statistical models after pouring over search results for
hours. modern "machine learning" or "cognitive analytics"'4a
methods apply algorithms to find patterns and meaning based on
context; the algorithms then fine-tune themselves in an iterative
process that proceeds without "any significant human
intervention.'· ..• As a result. the government's intelligence
capability is cheaper, faster, more powerful-and more elusivethan ever before. I• 6 By making correlations amongst infinite bits

Ibers involved. and
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or data

that are enriched by new technologies such as biometrics,
high-resolution cameras, aerial vehicles, and DNA sampling, I"; the
government can now track virtually anyone, anywhere, at any
time. An internal presentation dated April 2013 for senior NSA
analysts described PRISM as "the most prolific contributor to the
President's Daily Brief, which cited PRISM data in 1,477 itP.ms
[the prior] year.""7
Scholars have identified a litany of harms that flow from
unfettered government watching, including "self-censorship and
inhibition,""" decreased civility in social relationships,I."
restricted freedom to associate with others,I50 and reduced
When
accountability for those doing the monitoring. lnl
surveillance is automated, "the camera itself is not selective in
whom it watches; and it provides a searchable record which
trumps human memory in longevity, authority and accuracy."IS2
Manual surveillance, by contrast, requires that the watcher
identify a subject in advance and maintain Borne degree of
proximity to him.' When a machine collects the data, there are
fewer opportunities for human interaction that would enable the
subject to thwart the surveillance by hiding. Automation prevent/;
(describing the mutability of so-called "liquid surve illance," where by "[sJurveillnnct· poWl'r.
us exercised hy government depArtments, police agencim. and privatI! rurpurnti(ms .. . IIUW
nppear[s) ... in databases that may not even be 'in' the country in queRtion").
1>11' Pl!.'TlmHJ~N, supra nute 74, at 72-75, 743.
1·17 Ge1lman & Poitras, sf,pra note 136.
w, ANITA L. ALLEN. UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 172 (2(Jl1); Sef! n/tm
SHII'l.lo!R., supra note 123, At 240-43 (discussing how the sensation of beinK wntched afTt:>Cts
behnvior). This phcnomenon was identifiP:d. in an 1897 study in which the prt.'scnce of ot.ht'r
rider~ cAlised cyclists to pedal faster. Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian l.ooplwle: 711('
Present Constitutionality of Big Brother and the Potential for a First Amendment Cure. 5
FIRS1' AM ..:NII. L. REV. 234, 271 & n.136 (2007) (citing Norman Triplett. Tlu' IlYIWIIW/:t'II;C
Factors in Pacemaking and C.cmpetition. 9 AM. J. PsYCHO).. 507, 533 (1898).
'" See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 536-:17 (20116)
(describing how exposure may impede a person's ability to participate in society).
1&0 See ANGWIN, supra note 108, At 5]-64 (asserting that government surveillance
restricts freedom tn 8860Ciate through the internalization of censorship).
1~1 Sre Solove, supra note 149, at 508-09, 523 (explaining how data aggregation unRettlcR
people's expectations and how excluding people from participation in their personal data
reduces government accountability). See generally THE SURVE1Ll.ANCF. STUDIES READER
(Sean P. Hier & Joshua Greenberg ede., 2007) (collecting essays on topics such as how
surveillance operates as a modern mechanism of social control and structures individuRI
behavior and everyday life).
1&2 Kevin Mocnish, Unblinking Eyes: The Ethics of Automating Surveillance, 14 ETHICS
INFO. TECH. 151, 152 (2012).
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the watcher from assessing "the realities on the ground," making
"the possibility of negotiation, subtlety and discretion" less
likely.'"" The subject of the surveillance becomes disempowered.''''
Studies have also shown that the selection criteria programmed
into aut.omated systems is "overwhelmingly determined by age,
ethnicity and sex."11;S For example, "people from different cultures,
sexes and ages will behave differently in crowds."'56 If distinctive
behaviorH are built into an automated surveillance system, an
innocent individual "could register as deviating from the norm"
simply because she has a different cultural approach to personal
space and tolerance for crowds than expected. I• 7
As a
consequence, "[s]urveillance fosters suspicion in those who wield
it." liill The programmer's prejudices become "frozen into the code,
effectively institutionalizing those values,"'fi9
Since the Snowden scandal broke, the dangers of ubiquitous
government monitoring have become a frontline public issue. In
announcing plans to amend NSA practices, President Obama
aclm owl edged that the government's use of priva tely held data to
track Americans is unprecedented and poses novel constitutional
questions, "0' Google has urged customers to push for legislative
reform, "" The debate over technology's impact on personal
privacy has thus moved beyond identification of the problem; the
only salient question is what to do about it,
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,
I.'" fd. at 164.
I ~ '. fd.
•.\0\ Sef' ld. at 152, 15A (explaining how the prejudice that "overwhelms" manual
~ urye illam:tt iN often programmed into automated 8urvei11 ance sY.8tema).
Holi Id. a t. 15 9.
1&1

[d.

Klrstip Ball, Elizabeth Daniel, Sally Dibb & Maureen Meadows, Democracy,
.\)JJn l('llianre anrl "Knowing What's Good for You ':' The PrilKlte Sector Origins of Profiling
I

a nd the Birth of "CLtizen Relationship Management," in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY
III , 113 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas eds., 2010).
1&9 Mncniah, supra note 152, at 158.
UI) Obama's Speech on N.SA. Plume Surveillance. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2014, http://www.ny

timcR.coml2014l01l18/uslpJliticsiobamss-speech-on-nsa·phone·8urveillance.html?_r-O.
!til C'lOOgle Talle Aclion: Demand &al Surveillance Reform, GooGLE, https:lltakeaction.with
gongle.comipageJsJusa-freedom-act?utm_medium=80cial&utm_80uree=twitter (last visited Feb.
17,2015).
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III. OUTSOURCING, DATA INSOURCING, AND LEGISLATIVE REGIMES

When private coniractors and corporations perform public
functions, they confront far fewer statutory and regulatory
restrictions than do government actors engaged in identical
activities. ' 62 Contractors exercising outsourced pUblic powers are
not governed by the procedural restrictions that bind identical
government conduct.
Likewise, federal law leaves largely
unregulated the private sector's collection of personal
information. 163 As a result, the government and the private sector
are able to collaborate on intelligence gathering in ways that
"evade oversight and, at times, . .. defy the law.""" In this regard,
outsourcing and data insourcing are of a piece. '66 The executive

161 See Michaels, supra note 64, at 7l~19 (calling government contracts or contract
provisions that enable an outsourcing agency to achleve goals that would be difficult or
impossible in the course of ordinary pubhc admmist.ration "workaroundsj. Enhanced
regulation is one way of addressing the need (or accountabihtyo but it creates incentiveB to
maximize informality in outsourcing relationships. See Michaels, supra note 12. at 94::1
("[PJlacing more legal requirements between the Executive and its intelligence aims will
likely intensify the Executive's thirst for mformality.").
1M Danielle Keals Cltron. Reserooirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Prioot(' Law at
Ihe Dawn O(IM In(ormaJwnAge, 80 S. CAL. 1. REV. 241, 255 (2007). As a service to the public.
the Electronic Frontier Foundation has published a chart summarizmg the voluntary policies
of 1.nternet service providers, e-mail providers, mobile communications tools,
telecommunications companies.. cloud storage provide1'8, location-based services, blogging
platforms, and soClal networking sites" regarding cooperation with the government and public
transparency. including whether a company requires a warrant before turning over the
content of communications and whether it worms customers of the existence of government
requests for information. NATE CARDOZO ET AL.• WHO HAS YOUR BACK? PROTECTING YOUR

DATA FROM GOVERNMENT REQUESrS: THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FoUNDATIO>/'S FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS' PRIVACY AND TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES
REGARDING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO USER DATA 4, 18 (2014), available al https:llwww.elT.

org/fiIesl2014/0511Slwho-h ..·your·back·2014·govt·data·requests.pc!f.
1M Michaels. supra note 12, at 90l. See generally James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint,
Commercial Data and National Security. 72 GFJJ. WASH. L. REV. 1459 (2004). Many of the
voluntary agreements under which communications companies work with the NSA are
reportedly 80 sensitive that "only a handful of people in a company know of them. and they
are sometimes brokered directly between chief executive officers and the heads of the U.S.'a
major spy agencies.,.. which have reportedly traded access to classified intelligence for
cooperation. See Michael Riley. U.S. AgencLes Said to Swap Data WIth Thousands of Firm.~,
BLOOMBERG Bus. (June 14, 2013, 12:01 AM). http://www.bJoomberg.com/newsl2013·0S·14/u·
s.agenciesosaid.to-swap.data-with-thousands.of·firms.
1M See MIchaels. supra note 12. at 904 (observing that the use of private data for
surveillance 8 form of " 'privatIzation' 10 the guise of informal intelligence agreements with
corporations").

2015)

branch can 1:
for surveillal
A. OUTSOURC

Within th,
apply to fed
courts for pu,
the constitut
modes of pul:
(APA)166 is t
public invoh
government ,
(FOIA) provo
activities. 168
makes public
agencies. 16g
statutorily d
Register Act
public inspect
as the Data ,
guidance regE
Federal agenc
106 AdministrativE
amended in scatter(
11\7 See infra notes
Metzger, PrilKllizat;
whereas the APA
preventing fraud vel
1611 Freedom of Int.
held that the govern
publicly available da
scattered disclosure
whole. II u.s. Dep't of
119 Federal Advisor
110 Government in
171 Federal Registe
112 Consolidated AI
2763A·153 to .154

MANAGEMENT AND :

links Oast visited Ja
FOR EFFECTrvE

Gov

15, 2015) (referring ~

[Vol. 49:607

2015)

THE IRRELEVANT CONSTITUTION

635

branch can both outsource its functions and bootstrap private data
for surveillance without with relative impunity_

:SLATIVE REGIMES

.s perform public
, and regula tory
!lged in identical
public powers are
~at bind identical
w leaves largely
on of personal
. the private sector
'ing in ways that
'164 In this regard,
165 The executive

A. OUTSOURCING-RELATED STATUTES

Within the administrative hierarchy, a wide range of standards
apply to federal agencies by Congress, the President, and the
courts for purposes of limiting the discretion exercised on behalf of
the constitutional branches and for imposing transparency and
modes of public participation. The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)'66 is the primary statutory source for public disclosure,
public involvement in rule making, and judicial review of
government decisionmaking. 167 Its Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) provisions mandate public disclosure of government
activities_ISS The Federal Advisory Committee Act restricts and
makes public the advice that federal advisory committees provide
agencies_ 169
The Government in the Sunshine Act makes
statutorily defined agency meetings public_ 170
The Federal
Register Act requires publication of regulatory documents for
public inspection,171 and the Information Quality Act (also known
as the Data Quality Act) directs OMB to issue government-wide
guidance regarding the quality of information "disseminated by
Federal agencies_"172 Executive Order 12,866 also requires OMB
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'" Administrstive Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 796·404, 60 St.t. 237 (1946) (codified .s
amended in scattered sections of 5 U .S.C.).
lIST See infra notes 168-70 (describing the APA's parts and protections); see also Gillian E.
Metzger, Priuatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1434 (2003) (noting that,

whereas the APA applies only

to

agencies, regulations governing contractors focus on

preventing fraud versus providing a way to challenge contractors' actions).
1M Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). However, the Supreme Court has
held that the government can withhold from public disclosure databases composed entirely of
publicly available data, because there is a "di8tinction, in terms of personal privacy, between
scattered disclosure of the bits of information ... and revelation of the (information) as a

whole." U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989).
16& Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2012).
'" Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
'" Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C_ §§ 1601-1511 (2012).
\7'1 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. C, § 515, 114 Stat.
2763A-153 to -164 (2000); see Agency Information Quality Guidelines, OFFICE OF
MANAGEMfo~N1' AND BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblinCoreLagency_info_Quality_
link'" (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (noting § 515's popular name); Data Quality Act, CENTER
FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, http://www.foreffectivegov.orglnodel3479 088t visited Fed.

15, 2015) (referring to § 515 .s the Data Quality Act).

GEOUGJA LAW REVIEW

636

[Vol. 49:607

oversight of the regulatory process through its Office of
Informat.ion lind Hegulatory Affairs.173
None of the foregoing statutory constraints on government
conduct. lIppfy to private contractors exercising identical public
functions, however. The APA, the FOIA, and other disclosure
stat.utes do not cover private actors.174 Nor are contractors subject
to the same "pay caps, limits on political activity, and labor rules"
that apply to government employees.175 OMB Circular A·76
forbids the outsourcing of "inherently govemmentar' functions,'7.
but agencies routinely overlook it'77 and lack the personnel to
properly administer its requirements. 178 Although the Federal
Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) of 1998 codifies Circular A·
76's definition of "inherently governmental function,"J7· it contain6
no method for challenging the decision to outsource itself.18o
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Exec. Order No. 12.866, 58 Fed. Reg. 61.735 (Sept. 30, 1993), reprint~d as a.mended in
6 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012); .ee alBo Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U .S.C. §§ ~ 60 1 -3521
(2012) (establishing the Office of Information and Regulatory affairs within t he Office or
Management and Budget); 2 JACOB A STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL & BASIL J. M EZI N F.~ .
AoMINISTRA'rIVE LAw § 7.09 (2014) (des<:ribing the Paperwork Reduction Act, which cr e.te d
113

the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs) .
•14 See 6 U .S.C. § 651(1) (2012) (defining "agency" for the purposes of tho APA lind its
subparts).
115

Guttman, supra note 14. at 338.

17. OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A·76 REVISED I, A2 (2003) (stat ing thi. policy
Bnd criteria for determining what a re ''inherently governmental activltie,,"). Cir(:ulnr A·7()
predated tho Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998. which codified A· 7(l'g
definition of "inherently governmental function," 31 U.S.C. § 501 note Wederal Activitietl

Inventory Reform) (2012) ('T he term 'inherently governmental function' mearu; R funct ion
that 18 60 intimately related to the public interest B 8 to require performancn by Federal
Government employees,"). The statute then lists examples of the types of "CunctionM
include d" Id.
m See Freeman & Minow, supra note 29, at 3 (noting t hat government I'I:gpncieA IIfw n llU'k
the capacity to enforce contractual term s); see also Correction of LonK·Standing ErnJrs in
Agencies' Unsustainable Procurements Act of 2009, S. 924, 11 lth Cong. § ~i (2009) (fi ndi n~
that inherently governmental functi ons "have been wrongly outsourceci"); Concurre nt
Resolution on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 2010. S. Con. Ref!. 13, l11th Cont(.
§ 502(5) (2009) (requiring the Department of Defense to "review t he role t hot contract on.;
plAY in its operations, including the degree to which contractors ar€' pP.rfo rminK inhJ!rently
governmenta l functions .. ." (emphasis added».
178 PAUl.

R.

V ERKUJL, OUTSOURCING S OVEREIGNTY: WHY P RI VATI7.ATION OF GOVERNMRN'J'

F UNL"I'IONS THREATI<NS DEMOCRACY AND W HAT W E CAN Do ABoUT IT 12H (2007) ("Th"
a gency's designation of what is 'jnherently government' is not ImbjL'ft to a dministrativt!
review.").
1UI See supra note 176.
180 31 U.S.C. § 501 note (Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act).
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Accordingly, there are no external checks on government
outsourcing in the form of private rights of action to challenge
outsourcing decisions or contractor compliance. 'MI The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)182 governs the process by which the
government purchases goods and services, but only disappointed
bidders can challenge contract awards for noncompliance. '83 The
FAR's conflict of interest provisions do take into consideration
whether a contractor's aims are "at odds with the 'public interest,"
and existing rules can be waived for contracts deemed essentiaJ.184
Although private tort and contract law might apply to abuses by
government contractors, immunity defenses stymie lawsuits. 18s
Only the government can sue private contractors under the
Contract Disputes Act,l86 Moreover, it can contract out of
normative protections in the negotiating process l"7 and often lacks
See infra noles 176-90 and accompanying text.
The FAR is codified in Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations nnd is promulgated
by the General Services Administration, the Department of Defense. and the National
1M!

reprinted os amendild ill
44 U.S.C. §§ ~501~%2 1
'airs within the Offico of
:t,L & BASil, J. MEZINES,
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to

ndmini8trnLivt~

1112

Aeronautics and Space Administration under the authority of the Office uf Federal
Procurement Policy Act of 1974. See Exec. Order No. 12,979, 60 Fed. Reg. 55, 171 (Oct. 25,
1995), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. § 3701 note (2012).
'" See 31 U.S.C. § 3551(1)-(2) (2012) (giving "interested part[ies!" the right to file protests
und defining the term). Bidders can either challenge the agency's failure to comply with
Cireular A·76 under the APA or file bid protests with the GAO under 31 U.S.C. § 3551
(2012). Robert H. Shriver III, No Seat at the Table: Flawed Contracting Out Process
Unfairly Limits Front-Line Federal Employee Participation, 30 PuB. CONT. L.J. 613, 627
(2001) (citing CC Distribs. V. United States, 883 F.2d 146, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding no
constitutional standing to sue»; see also VerkuiJ, Bupra note 20, at 453 (,"rhis leaves
contractors themselves the most likely candidates to achieve judicial review and makes
such review dependent upon the government denying rather than granting a request to
privatize a government function."); cf id. at 454 (suggesting that the Subdelegation Act
might provide an avenue for judicial review of delegations to private parties).
II\.( Guttman. supra note 19, at 898 (citing Organizational Conflicts of lntet·e~t. 4K C.F.R.
pt. 2009.5 (1999».
18ft See. e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550. 567 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying immunity to
private foster care contractor in action under federal disability Jaws); Pani v. Empire Blue
Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying immunity to a private insurance
company in a Medicare dispute); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only
Problem, 76 Gfm. WMH1. L. REV. 1216, 1228-29 (2008) (flrguing thnt privnte contractors
should not be immunized for government work performed).
,.. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2012).
1"7 See Freeman, supra note 42, at 591 (noting that t!ven if "lprivllLe lawl provided a hasis
for extending common law norma into contract law, p~uti~8 could presumahly minimize or
avoid their new obligations by explicitly contracting out of them"). Rut rl. Jody Freeman,
&tending Public I~aw Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. RfW. 1285, 1296 (2003)
(arguing that contracts should reflect public law values through a process of
"publiciutionj; Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Tlwory and the Failurts of Public·PrilJOle
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the resources or motivation to pursue common law remedies. 1B11
The False Claims Act (FCA)189 enables qui tam suits to recover
penalties from private contractors for fraud only so long as its
formidable requirements are satisfied. loo
.r
In sum, the administrative law norms that exist within a
government bureaucracy and constitutional democracy do not
apply to private contractors.191 Nor has Congress creat,ed private
rights of action to constrain ultra vires outsourcing decisions or to
enforce contract terms that do not involve false claim submissions
within the meaning of the FCA. As a result, the government is
largely left to self-regulate its outsourcing programs through use
and sharing agreements that it may not decide to enforce. l92
B. DATA INSOURCING-RELATED STATUTES

Federal surveillance laws bearing upon data insourcing-like the
laws applicable to outsourcing-leave substantial gaps in both
government and private sector accountability, The statutory
landscape relating to surveillance data shifted substantially in
response to global terrorism. Pre-9/ll, Congress enacted the 1968
Wiretap Act,19a the FISA of 1978,194 the Electronic Communications

ContractilJg. 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2254. 2256 (2013) (afl{lling a mandatory duty to act
in furtherance of the public interest should be implied in all government outsourcing
contracts and that "members of the public for whose benefit the service WaR being
provided-and who are harmed when service provision is poor-should be permitted to sue
8S third·party beneficiarles for breach of the public interest duty").
1118 See Jody Freeman. Extending Public Accountability Through Privatization.: Fram
Public Law to PublicizaJ.ion, in PUBUC ACCOUNTABJU1Y: DESJGNs., DJLF.MMA..~ ANU
EXPEHIENCr..8 83, 97-98 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (explaining how both the executive
and legislative branches may lack the motivation to hold private actors accountable).
'''' 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012).
110 Laura A Dickinson , Public ValueslPriuate Conl.ract, in G{)Vl~RNMt;NT fly CONTUAGT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 18, at 335, 356.
Ull See Kimberly N. Brown, "We the People," Constitutional Accountability. and Outsourcing
Government. 88 IND. L.J. 1347. 1361-64 (2013) (comparing accountability measUreR
constraining government actors and the lack thereof regarding private contractors).
192 See supra note 177 (explaining the current inadequacy of legislative, re gulatory, nnd
constitutional methods of oversight); see also Brown, supra note 191. at 1364-69.
'" 18 U.S.C. §§ 251~252O (2012). The Wiretap Act waa enacted as T>tle III of the Omnibus
Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. !JO.351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at
scattered sections of 18, 42 U.S. C.). See SOLOVE. ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, 8upra note 76, at
84-85 (noting 'Wiretap Act" as the name of the statute).
,.. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2012).
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Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 '95 (which contains the Stored
Communications Act (SCA»,196 and the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994.'97 These laws largely
authorized the interception and storage of wire, oral, and electronic
communications under circumstances that mayor may not require
probable cause and a warrant, The FISA stands apart from the
others because it applies to foreign-versus domestic-intelligence
and is triggered by a relatively lesser showing on the government's
part.'""
Post-9/ll, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,'99
the Protect America Act (PAA) of 2007,200 and the FISA
Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008.'''" These statutes amended the
}<'ISA to provide the government with expanded authority that
gave rise to the controversial Verizon order and the NSA's PRISM
program, both of which effectively enabled the collection of
Americans' communications data without probable cause and a
warrant}"2
1. Before 9111. Pre-9/ll surveillance legislation restricted the
and
electronic
government's
ability to
collect voice
communications, both in-transit and from storage repositories, It
also imposed civil and criminal liability for unilateral violations by

II'~ ~~Iectronic

Communications Privacy Act or 1986, Pub. L. No. 99·508, 100 Stat. 184ti

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
... 1M U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2012).
"n 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-\01IJ (2012).
1l1li See infra notes 230-39 and accompanyin g text .
1I~..1 Uniting nnd Strengthening America by ProVlChng Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107·56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified a8 amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, 50 U.S.C,). Notably,
Congres." aUowed § 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, a section that allOW3 for bulkcoUection of U.S.
citizens' ceUphone data, to sunset in Jun~ of2015. Jeremy Diamond, Patriot Act Provisions Have
Expired: What Happens Now?, CNN PoLlTIC,q (June 1, 2015), httpJlwww.cnn.coml2015l05l:Wpo

liticslwhat-happens·if·the-patriot-act-provislons-expirel (explaining that the Senate allowed key
provisions orthe law to lapse, incJuding the NSA's bulk data collection program).
"'" Protect America Act of 2007, 50 U.S .C. §§ 1805a-1805c (2012) .
:lilt !<'ISA Amendment Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified os
amended in scattered Hections or50 U.S. C.).
.., See BRENNAN CENTER ~'OR JUS'rICE, ARE THEY ALLOWED TO Do T HAT? A BREAKDOWN 01'
St:LKL"' ~: D GOVEKNM ";NT SURVlm ,LANCE P ROGRAMS (2013), aooilabl~ at http://www.brennance
nter.urg/situ£/dllfuultlJilus/analysi s/Government%20Survei11ance%20FAch heet.pdf (providing a
breakdown of the new government surveillance programs and explaining their statutory
justmcatio118).,..
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the private sector, while immunizing third parties for cooperating
with government investigations.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 ("the Wiretap Act")203 made it illegal for anyone to intercept
or disclose wire or oral communications,204 which it defines as
utterances "by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation."206 The statute expressly covers the
"contents" of communications, i.e., "any information concerning the
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication."206 It
permits law enforcement to apply for a judicial wiretap order only
upon a showing of probable cause that the target is involved in
serious crimes that are enumerated in the statute.207 The
government must provide notice to the target and minimize
collection of unrelated communications.208 The statute also
imposes civil and criminal liability for violations,209
The ECPA of 1986 expanded the Wiretap Act's protections for
voice communications to ban the intentional interception, use, or
disclosure of "electronic communications,"210 which is defined in
such a way as to cover e-mail and Internet activity.2lI The ECPA
thus makes it unlawful for a third party to intercept someone
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). This formulation reflects the seminal decision in Katz IJ,
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which preceded the Wiretap Act by Olle yo". .<We
Freiwald, supra note 92, at 21- 22. In Katz, the Supreme Court ex pressly declined to
address whether a warrant 18 required in cases involving national Be<:urity. 389 U.R Itt:JfiH
n.23; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511. 532 (1985) ("In the afterm ath of Katz.
Executive authority to order warrantless national security wiretaps re mained uncertAin.").
'" 18 U.S.C. § 251 0(2) (2012).
"" Id. § 2510(8).
'" Id. §§ 2518(3), 2516(1); see also Freiwald, supra note 92, ot 23-25.
"" 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(5), 2518(8)(d).
•• Id . §§ 2511 . 2520.
210 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. H9·5()8, 100 Stat l H4H
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S. C.); see aL<;(J 18 U.H.C. § 2511 (20 12)
(making it unlawful to intentionally intercept any "wire, ornl , or electronic cnmmunicntion").
:! ll See United Stutes v. Councilman. 418 F.3d 67. 79 (18t Cir. 2(05) ("'Wit· cnnrlulh· that tl Ktemporarily stored e·mail messages at issue here constitute electronic communications wit hin
the scope of the Wiretap Act . .. .'1j Kerr, supra note 138, at 630 (st.Rting thnt ConJ(n.'HH
expanded the Wiretap Act to the lnternet in 1986 when It enacted t.he ECPA). The Jo~C PA
defines an "electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, imagc8,
ROunds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire. radio.
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptica] system that affects lnterstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).
203
2£l,I
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else's e-mail without hiB or her consent."l" The ECPA contains the
Stored Communications Act (SCA),"" which protects stored
communications such as those maintained by an individual's
Internet service provider (ISP), and imposes criminal fines or
imprisonment on anyone who intentionally accesses or discloses
such communications without authorization."l' It also contains
the Pen Register Act;'5 which requires a court order before
installation of a device for recording telephone numbers dialed (a
"pen register") or telephone numbers from which incoming calls
originate (a "trap and trace device").21"
The ECPA and the SCA contain exceptions that make it possible
for private parties to lawfully capture and store electronic
communications and share them with the government. The ECPA
contains a business use exception, whereby employees of electronic
communications service providers may "intercept, disclose, or use"
electronic communications in the normal course of employment for
"mechanical or service quality control checks.'''l7 It also authorizes
the government to obtain warrants requiring that providers
"furnish ... all information, facilities, and technical assistancp
necessary to accomplish .. . interception[s) unobtrusively."2I"
Additionally, the ECPA authorizes third-party service providers to
hand over information to the government pursuant to a FISA order
or a certification by the Attorney General or a designee that no such
order is required. 2 !U A similar provision in the Pen Register Act
", See IH U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)-(5). 2520 (2012) (imposing criminal ond civil liubility fnr
vioJa.tioOlI).
'" Id. §§ 2701-2711.
'" Id. § 2701(a)-(b).
:llll Jd. §§ 3 12 1- :3127. The Pen Regislp.t Act governg the U~ of devices thai lrtll_~ whut hm.
been termed "envelope information" (including "addressing" and ''routing'' information for e·
mail), id. § :l127(:!), while the Wiretap Act and the SeA govern "content information," :;t'(! itl
§ 2511}( 1), (4), (R), (12) (defining "intercept" under the Wiretap Act to mean "the uurnl m'
other II:cquhntmn of the contents of Rny wire, t>Jcctronic, or oral communication throu.::h lhl'
ufle of nny ek'Ctron ic, mechanical, or other device," and providing definitions fOl' "witl'
communication," "contents," and "electronic communication"),
l lU

Jd, § 3121(8); sc>e also id. § :U27(3)-(4) (defining "pen register" and "t rap Rnd

h'Rl'!'

rlevic:c").
m /d. § 2 [111(2)(a){i); :.·~e .Jarrod .J. White, C'..ommentary. B·mail@WorkCom: Rmplu,l'l>1'
N,'onitoring of b'mployee E·mail, 48 AlA L. REV. 1079. 1086 (1997) (stating that 18 D.H-C.
§ 2511(2)(o)(i) (20 1:l) i~ a souret! ror the "business U!:l~ exemption," wh ich an emplDYI~r mn)'
n ~ scrt. to moni tor an e mploycc'~ ('·muB in the abRcncc or express 01' implit!d (.'UI1b1:IIl).
' " 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
' 1' Id. § 25 11(2)(0)(ii).
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lI iloWfl Ii ... (Ox Plllt" ortlers requiring that service providers install
"11I'veiillllw(' equipment at the government's behest."u
Fnr il.H plll·t, the SCA empowers the government to obtain the
eOlllplll.s of wire or electronic communications with a warrant or by
Huhpoena with prior notice to the subscriber.221 Non·content
information may be obtained pursuant to a warrant or a court
order that does not require probable cause. 222 The SCA exempts
service providers from civil or criminal liability regardless of the
purpose of the interception;22-1 in this way, it differs from the
Wiretap Act's narrower exemption for "activit[ies] which [are] a
necessary incident to the rendition of his service."224
Law enforcement routinely makes use of ECPA and SCA
exceptions to collect electronic data regarding private citizens. An
internal DOJ "Electronic Surveillance Manual" indicates that the
SCA is commonly used to obtain cell tower dump records,225 which
it can use to determine a cell phone's approximate location within
a few hundred yards.226 Recently, the government invoked the
"" Id. § 3123.
Id. § 2703(s)-(b)(1). There is a question as to whother the ECPA's requirements bind
just the service provider or whether the government is precluded from making a request for
information without complying with the ECPA first. In McVeigh u. Cohen, 983 F. Supp.
215,218-19 (D.D.C. 1998), the Navy discharged an officer for homosexual conduct it derived
from information it informally obtained from AOL. The Navy took the position-rejected by
the court-that the ECPA contains no prohibitions relating to government conduct. Id. at
220. A service provider could arguably lurn over information to other private parties
without. n warrant, subpoena, or a court order under the ECPA, RS well.
:lX.l Sce 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (requiring "reasonable grounds 10 believe that the ... records or
other information f'Ought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation"
(emphasis added». Recently, in an appeal ofa criminal conviction bAsed in part on location
records obtained from cell phone service providers under the SCA, the Eleventh Circuit
found the statute unconstitutional to the extent that it allowfl the government to obtain
slich information without a warrant. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210-18 (11th
Cir. 2014). uaca",d en bane, 573 F. App'x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (mem.).
,., 18 U.8.C. §§ 2701(c)(I), 2703(.).
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application for a ("(lUrt order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which includes "cell site information"
within the types of information the applicant can apply for disclosure 00.
:m; Hon. Brian I.. Owsley, Tile Fourth Amendment Implications of the Oouernment's Use of
Cell Tower Dump. in Its Electronic SurveiUance. 16 U. PA. J. CoNST. L. " 5 (2013). When.
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SCA to obtain records from the Twitter accounts of individuals
associated with the WikiLeaks organization. 227
The SCA also allows law enforcement agencies to use National
Security Letters (NSLs)221l to obtain information from ISPs and
telephone companies without a court order if the government
certifies that the records it seeks are "relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism or
Google has reportedly
clandestine intelligence activities."22'
received thousands of NSLs issued over the last few years,
implicating tens of thousands of users and accounts. 230
Congress passed the FISA in 1978, after Watergate raised
public awareness of the executive branch's long history of
warrantless surveillance for national security and political
purposes. 231 Whereas the Wiretap Act, the ECPA, and the SCA
are criminal statutes implicating domestic intelligence, the FISA
was enacted to enhance the government's capacity to obtain
"foreign intelligence information" by eavesdropping on people
suspected of working with foreign governments on United States
soiJ.232 It thus has a "lower threshold for conducting surveillance
regarding the proximity of a particular phone to a particular cell tower, the position of the
tower in relation to the phone, and the signal strength of the phone for billing and other
purposes. Id. at 5.
:!21 Scott Shane & John F. Burns, U.S. Subpoenas Twitter Over Wiki Leoks Supporters,
N.Y. TIM"", Jan. 9. 2011, at AI, auailable at http://www.nytime• .coml2011IDlI09/worldl09
wiki.html; Glenn Greenwald, DOJ Subpoenas 7\vitter Records of Seuerol WtkiLeaks
Volunteers, SALON (Jan. 7, 2011, 11:08 PM). http://www.ltalon.coml2011101l08ltwitter_21.
22Il For background on NSLs, see SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING L IBERTIES: THE WAR ON
TERROR AND THE EROSION 0" AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150--64 (2011).
;1211 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b).
The statute states that "[a] wire or electronic communication
tiervice provider shall comply with a request for subscriber information a nd ton billing
records information, or electronic communication transactional records in its custody or
possession made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation unde r subsection (b)
of this section." Jd. § 2709(a) (emphasis added). In In. re National S ecurity Letter, 930 F.
Supp. 2d 1064, 1075-77 (N.D. Cal. 2013), a federal district judge held the statute's provision
prohibiting a recipient from disclosing the existence of an NSL, 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c), violated
the First Amendment. and that the narrow and deferentia} provision for judicial review, id.
§ 3511(b), violated the }I'irst Amendment and the separation of powers.
:l.'lI1 Traftsparellcy Report: Requests For User Illformation, GOOGLE, https:llwww.google.
oom/tranHparencyrt~portJ\\serdatarequestslUSI (last visited Feb. 20, 20 15).
~L See Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 and Ideas for Puture Surueillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. I NT. L.J. 269. 275 (2009)
(describing pre·FISA history of governmental abu~s).
,,, See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(e)-(0. 1802 (2012). The FISA make. numerous distinction.
based on whether the surveillance target is foreign or a U.S. national a nd whether t he
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[t,hat] reflects the inherent differences between obtaining
Hurveillnnce for intelligence (e.g. prevention) purposes, as opposed
to obtaining evidence to be used to convict an individual in II court
of law."":!
The FISA does not require that the government demonstrate
probable cause that a search will reveal evidence of a crimp so as
to justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate judge."'I ' It
instead allows the government to apply to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC}-a special panel of eleven federal
district court judges2:I!;-for an ex parte order authorizing
electronic surveillance of Americans for up to ninety days.2:16 The
government must show, inter alia, that "the target of the electronic
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power" and
that "a significant purpose" of the investigation is to obtain foreign
intelligence. 237 Although no indication of criminal wrongdoing is
required for foreign subjects, in order to obtain a warrant
regarding a "United States person" the government must
demonstrate probable cause to believe that the person is
"knowingly" engaged in activities that "involve or may involve a
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States:'23~ The
statute also mandates that the government craft "minimization
procedures" to limit its collection, storage, and dissemination of
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obtaining
as opposed
.1 in a court

non-foreign-intelligence information."39 In certain circumstances,
the FISA authorizes surveillance without a court order.240
In 1994, Congress passed the CALEA and President Bill
Clinton signcd it into law."" The CALEA was enacted in response
to FBI complaints that advancing digital technologies were
mRking it difficult to perform surveillance over telephone
networks."" The statute requires telecommunications carriers to
develop and modify their equipment, facilities, and services to
ensure that they can comply with the FBI's electronic surveillance
requirements.·'" Any interceptions conducted on the premises of a
communications provider must be done pursuant to a court
order."'"
2. Afler 9/11. In the wake of 9/11, Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act. of 2001,2'5 which amended the FISA in a number of
important ways. For example, prior to the 2001 amendments, the
government had to persuade the FISA court that "the purpose" of
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"" ,.,.", id. §§ IHIY!(u), 11\05(0, 1809(a)(I), 1811; SOI.OVl:, ROT>:N8l:RCl & SCHWAR'I"t, supra
nute 75, Ilt 104. ~'ourth Amendment challenges to the FISA and its amendments have been
UIl~lI('Ct'Ssrul. SI!r!, e.g., United States v. Abu·Jihaed, 630 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2010)
(denying dcfemlnnt's constitutional challenges to FISA after admission of evidence that
dllfcncinnl CIImmunicated nation!!l defense information and provided materials to
terroris.ts): United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 984 (D. Minn. 2008) (finding
thul pndmhll' CRU~l tmd particularity requirements of FISA satisfied reasonableness
requirement of io'ourth Amendment where defendant was charged with conspiracy and with
providing matenal support and resources to terrorists).
llli Cnmmuniration~ A......-listance of Law Enforcement Act. Pub. L. No. 103-414, lOS Stat.
~279 (1994) (codified
omended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012».
2.12 FUH.IOI.A., supra note 117, at 1 (noting that complaints by the FBI of increased
difficulty nc(·tlssing public telephone networks contributed to the enactment of CALEA).
'" 47 U.RC. §§ H102, 1005 (2012) .
..., Id. § 1004.
\lU Uniting nnd Htrengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept a nd Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 208(a). 110 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49,
50 u.s. C.). The USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3.161, which possed the house in May 2014, would
,'xtenrl'he USA Patriot Act to 2017. USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 701(0)
(2014); see also H.R. 3361 (113Ih): USA FREEDOM Act, GOVTRACK.US, https:/Iwww.govtra
ck .ul:llb mgressibiIl6l113IhnS:i61 (last visited Feb. 21, 2015) (noting that the bill passed the
HotllU' hut died in the Renate). Although it was designed to curtail the NSA's bulk
collection of meta data, partly by shifting the retention of metadata to private firms, privacy
advocates Ilssailed the bill. Andrea Peterson, NSA Reform Bill Passes House, Despite Loss
of Sup}}f)rt from Pril1tlCy AdVOC'aWJ, WASil. POST, May 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/the-switchlwp/2014/05l22/nsa.reform.bill.passes.house.despite.loss-of.support.fro
m.privary.udvocatesl.
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its surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. 2 •m
Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act narrowed the government's
burden to demonstrating that foreign intelligence is "a significant"
purpose of the FISA surveillance."'7
It also expanded the
government's ability to obtain ex parte orders authorizing physical
searches,2' Hpen registers, and trap and trace devices;'''' expanded
the length of the FISA's surveillance periods;"'" and increased
access to emergency surveillance.'51
In addition, § 215 of the statute-which expired on May 31,
2015"''---significantly enhanced the government's ability to obtain
business records such as customer book lists, library patron
records, and medical records from third-party telephone and ISP
companies. 253 Although grand juries routinely issue subpoenas for
business records in criminal investigations, no showing of probable
cause was required under § 215."" Rather, the application only
needed to include "a statement of facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
relevant to an authorized investigation."""'· Moreover, companies
served with § 215 orders were prohibited from disclosing that fact
to anyone, including the subjects of the surveillance. 256 The FISA
court's controversial order to Verizon in April of 2013, made public
with the [lIst of the Snowden leaks, was issued pursuant to
§ 215.'57 It broadly required Verizon to provide the NSA with
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USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107·56. § 2 18. liS Rtnt. 272, 291 (2001).
[d. §§ 206, 207, liS Stat. at 282.
[d. § 214 , lI5 Sta~ at 286-87 (a mending the FISA).
[d. § 207(0), 115 Stat. at 282.
'" [d. § 212(1), 115 Stat. at 284.
~ See Diamond, supra note 199.
" " [d. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (codified at 60 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012» (uuthurizing
production of j'any tangible things" related to "an investiga tIOn" regarding (orcign
intelligence not concerning United States persons or "to prowct tlgainliit international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities", ; see Donohue, BI/pm notc 1:17, /1(, IZH n. :12
(citing § 215 68 increasing gove mme nt access to certain busine ss TL"Cords).
2M See 50 U .S.C. § 1861.
The Executive must "fully inform" Cungrl!HH 1\ 1'1 to the
implementation of § 215 on an annual basis. Id. § 1862(8).
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telephone call metadata for the approximately 101.2 million
wireless accounts in its systems for a three-month period?5B
Although the FISA limited the government's ability to engage
in warrantless spying on U.S. nationals,259 after 9/11 President
George W. Bush issued an executive order unilaterally authorizing
the NSA to eavesdrop on Americans' e-mail and telephone
communications if a person was believed to have terrorist links.2GO
Under the Bush Administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program,
the NSA conducted "vacuum cleaner surveillance" in conjunction
with private telecommunications companies for purposes of
identifying potential terrorist threats, and only then utilized the
FISA procedures to further investigate.26t In 2007, the FISA court
condoned the program, "g[iving] the government access to nearly
all of the international telecom traffic entering and leaving the
United States.''262 The PAA was also enacted in 2007 to provide
legislative backing for programmatic surveillance beyond the casespecific confines of the FISA. 263
Upon the PAA's expiration in 2008, Congress passed the FAA.""
Whereas the FISA tolerates interceptions of communications
266 Id.; see also Verizon Posts Double·Digit Earnings Growth and Continued Strong
Operating Performance in 3Q: 3Q 2013 Highlights, VERIZON.COM, http://www.verizonwireleM.
comlnewslartic1e12013110/93-2013-earnings,html Oast visited Feb. 21. 2015) (noting Verizon's
101.2 million retail connections in 2013). The FISA court on February 26, 2015 approved an
extension of a modified telephony metadata collection program until June I, 2015. the date on
which § 215 is set to expire. Statement by the White House Press Secretary, TH e: WHITE HOUSE
OFF.CI; OF THE PRESS SECR~"TARY (Feb. 27. 2015), auai/able at https:/Iwww.wh.tehouse.gov/
the·press-ofI'icel2015102l27/statement-pres8·secretary·reauthorization<oUection.bulk.telephon
y-meta (commenting on the reauthorization of the Collection of Bulk Telephony Metadata
Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act).
261' JAMES G. MCADAMS, FED. LAw ENFORCEMENT TRAINING FACn.rrIES. FoREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA): AN OVERVIEW 1-2 (2007). auailable at http" l/www.
fletc.gov/sitesldefaultlflleslimported.JilesltraininglprogramalJegal·divisionldownloads·articles·
and.faqslresearch-bY·8ubjectJmisce1l8neouslForeignlntelligenceSurveillanceAct.pdC.
2to Blum. supra note 231, at 283; Banks, supra note 234, at 1641.
211\ Banks, supra note 234, at 1641-42.
262 Id. at 1643.
263 Id. at 1644; Blum, supra nate 231, at 296-97.
Z64 Gene Healy, Our Continuing Cull of the Presidency, m. TH E PRESIDENCY IN TH&
Tw':N1'Y·FIII.'"T C~NTURY 145, 153 (Charles W. Dunn cd., 2011). Section 702 of the FAA
amended the FISA at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. L10·
261, § 702. 122 Stat. 2436, 2438. The FAA was reautho rized in 20 12. H.R. Res. 5949, 112th
Cong. (2012) (enacted). Sec /lell.rally EUWARD C. L.U, CONGo R ESEARCH S ERV.• R42725.
REAtrrHORIZATION Ol-~THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT (201 3) (dlSCussing the reauthorizatIOn of
the FAA).
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involving perRons on U.S. soil, the FAA only allows for the targeting
of non-U.S. persons outside the United States.""" However, it docs
not require an individualized determination by the FISC as a
precondition to surveillance of a specific target. 266 The FAA instead
empowers the U.S. Attorney General (AG) and the Director of
National Intelligence (ON!) to obtain a so-called "certification order"
from the FISC empowering them to jointly authorize, for up to one
year, the surveillance of non-U.S. citizens outside of the United
States for foreign intelligence purposes. 267 Rather than requiringas the FISA does-that a target be an agent of a foreign power,26"
the FAA provides that the FISC "shall"26" issue a certification order
upon a showing, inter alia, that "a significant purpose of the
acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information.... 7o The
court must approve "targeting" and "minimization" procedures in its
certification order to ensure that only people "reasonably believed to
be outside the United States" are targeted and to minimize any
privacy impact. 27 J
After the FISC issues a certification order, the AG and DNI can
direct that electronic communications providers assist in
An
surveillance in exchange for retroactive immunity,272
immunity provision is triggered if the AG certifies to one or more
of five conditions. 27" In such cases, no civil action may be
maintained "against any person for providing assistance to an
element of the intelligence community."27' Only companies served
with FAA orders can challenge related requests for information
before the PISC. "7:,

'" fiO U.S.C. § IHHln(b) (20 121.
2fiIi NSA n IH. OF CIVil , L unm'l'It:''-: ANIJ PRIVACY Ofo'I·'IGfo:, NHA's I MPU·;Ml-:N'rATION (W
FOREIGN IN1'RfJ.IC:fo:NCR SURVEII.IANel,! ACT Hfo;rTJON 7<r2, at 2 (2014), ouai/abi!' at http://
WWW.fI1H.C Irgli rp/ntUlJcl po.. 702. pelf.

'" 50 U.s.C. § IMln(o).
'" Id. §§ 18()4(n)(~)(A). IH04(0)((;)(II).
'" [d. § 18Hl o(i )(~)(A).
"" 'd. § 18!l1n(g)(2)(A)(v).
'" [d. § IRR l n(g)(2)(A).
:01"12 [d. §§ 188Ia(a), 1885a(0); 8f'e LHura K. Donohue, The Shadow of Slale Secrets. 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 77, 157 (2010) (dl.!lCussinK the arrangements).
273 60 U.S.C. 1885.(0).
'" [d. § 1886. (0).
:'16 Id. § IBR l a(h)(4){A) rAn t'il.actnmic communication service provider receivinC a directive
iasued pUJ'8uant to paragmph (1) mfl.y file a petition to modlfy or set 8lIide such directive with
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Commentators have criticized the FAA as "permitting the mass
Ilequisition, without individualized judicial oversight or
supervision, of Americans' international communications."'76
Rection 702 of the FAA is the stated legal authority for the
I(overnment's PRISM program,277 under which the NSA "tap[ped)
directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet
compllnieA," and extracted "photographs, e-mails, documents, and
, connection logs," along with audio and video data. 278 Those
companies included Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk,
AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple."?" The NSA describes the
PRISM program as "compel [ling)" service providers "to provide
NSA with communications to or from" individuals identified as
likely to communicate foreign intelligence information. 280 It also
"eompel[s)" service providers "to assist ... in the lawful
interception of electronic communications to, from, or about tasked
Heledors" under § 702 .261
Onc(' intercepted, "[c)ommunications provided to NSA under
Section 702 are processed and retained in multiple NSA systems
anrI data repositories.''2On There are no legal restrictions on the
government's ability to search such data, which can operate as an
end·run around the FAA's ban on surveillance of U.S. nationals. 2B3

lin' F'm,.ign Il1t~lI ig(!lll'(' Sllntt~illuncu Court. which "hall have jurisdiction to review such
pptition.").
2111 .Jaml·~I.J u rre r & Laura W. Murphy, Oversight Hearing on the Administration's Use 0/
FJ8A tllltiUJrilics, l ~ ";Nn AO fo~: J. F EOERAI.IST SOC'y PRAC. GROUPS 76, 78 (2013).
:m 50 U.R(,. § l AAla(a) ("lTJhc Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
mny authorize joint ly, for a period of up to 1 year from the effective date of the
nuthoriznt ion, t he targe ting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United
~ lntl-'N tu acquire fOl'eign int elligence information.j; DoNAHUE, 8upra note 40, at 2; Glenn
Oreenwuld & g wen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple Google
unrl Ot/II·rs. 1'm: GUAIU)fAN (.June 7, 201 3, 3:23 PM), http~/www.theguardian.com/warldJ20
131junlO6Iuli·tech·giants·nsa-da ta; see Gellman & Poit ras, supra note 136, at Al (stating
t hat thf~ f"fSA Amendments gAve rise to the PRISM project).
21>1 lloNAtUlt-:, Iwpm nau> 40, at 1 (quotin g Gellman & Poitras, srtpra note 136, at AI).
:./;79 Ut-llmon & Poitrafll , Sllp ra note 136.
Interest ingly. the Government Communications
Headquartprs-Britain's equivalent of the NSA-had a lso been secretly gathering the same
inlclhKel1l't· flTlm t ht~ !,jj' nine companies t hrough a n operation set up by the NSA. bypassing
the formnl h~gal proceSR requ ired u nder their own laws. [d.
1ItO NHA Om. IlP CIVIL LI BERTIES AND PRIVACY O FFICE, 61lpra note 266, at 5.
2H1

ld.

[d. at H.
:tlI3 &e l)nnohu(', Rupra note 137. at 160. 192 (noting how the "to, from, and about"
languat:w of § 7IJ2 has been misused).
282
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Laura Donohue has identified numerous violations of the FAA
resulting from the lack of FISC oversight over specific searches of
the NSA's metadata databases. 284 Moreover, before the Snowden
disclosures gave rise to the lower court decisions in Klayman v.
Obama285 and ACLU v. Clapper,286 lawsuits brought by individuals
challenging these surveillance schemes have failed because the
secretive nature of the programs makes it difficult for plaintiffs to
establish the requisite injury."87 Commentators have thus assailed
the FISA and the FAA as providing insufficient safeguards for
individual privacy rights protected by the Constitution.288
IV. THE REACH OF POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL FIXES

Despite its inadequacies, the prospect of new legislation
remains the primary means of establishing limits on data
insourcing and outsourcing. 289 The relevant constitutional law is
ad hoc, with no coherent framework for minding constitutional
tolerance of modern alterations to the structure of government.
Moreover, no doctrine is particularly robust for purposes of
confining the privatization of government, as all are premised on a
flawed assumption that the public and private sectors are
severable for purposes of constitutional law.

284 DONAHUE, sup ra note 40, at 40-54 (discussing three important waYt> the NSA hOR Rid!!,
stepped statutory requirements).
2M 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. D.C. 201 3). See infra notes 373-74 and accompanying text.
'" No. 14·42·CV, 2015 WL 2097814 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2015). See i,,(ra not~'375 and
accompanying text.
"" See Clapper v. Amnesty InCl. USA. 13:J S. Ct. 113H. 1155 (201 3) (holding thnl
plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate present or impending injury barred standing to chal1en~
the constitutionality of FISA); Am. Civil Liberties Union Y. Nnt'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 64 4,
687 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing).
2811 E.g., Donohue, supra note 137, at 174-90, 202-06, 243-65 (arguing that the NSA's
metadata mining programs violate the FISA and the Con stitution); Ba nks, .<fupra note 234.
at 1656 ("(DI ne inevitable problem with the relaxed standard (of the FAA) is that ... more
warrantless surveiUance of persons inside the United States will occur."); Alan Butler,
Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance,
48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55, 63-67 (2013) (indicating that the main problem with the FISA is
"inadequate transparency and public accountablllty").
:lM1I Butler, supra note 288, at 82-91; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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A. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

In theory, the state action doctrine extends the Constitution to
limit or remedy the negative effects of private behavior that is
attributable to the government.290 In practice, it converts private
actors into state ones for purposes of suppressing evidence in
criminal trials or attaching liability for violations of individual
constitutional rights. 29 ' In Shelley v. Kraemer, Chief Justice
Vinson famously stated that the Fourteenth Amendment "erects
no shield against mt:rely private conduct, however discriminatory
or wrongful.. 29 2.....-unless. the Court later explained, "to some
significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been
found to have become involved in [the conductj."293
The traditional aims of the state action doctrine are twofold:
first, to "preserve[) an area of individual freedom by limiting the
reach of federal law and federal judicial power"'·' and, second, to
"avoid[ j the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it
could not control."" ;' The doctrine thus simultaneously seeks to
maintain private parties' autonomy and freedom on the one hand,
and to ensure that the government is responsible for matters that
lie within its sphere of authority on the other. By necessity, it
assumes that a meaningful dividing line exists between the public
and private.
Legal commentators have critiqued the doctrine's task as
impossible. 296 The Supreme Court itself has quipped that "[w)hat is
:!1I11 See infra note 292 and accompanying text (explaining that private actors may be
subject to the Constitution if the government is sufficiently involved in their conduct).
211 Private parties may be subject to money damages for constitutional violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 only if they are found to be acting under "color of law." Flagg Bros. v. Brooks.
436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). The Court has stated that "the state action and the under color·
of·s tate·law requirements are obviously related." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.• 457 U.S.
922. 928 (1982); Bee also Verkuil, supra note 20, at 431 (observing that the state action
doctrine M 'constitutionalizes' after· the fact delegations that amount to the exercise of public
authority" rather than limiting them in the first instance).
'" 334 U.S. 1. 13 (1948).
' " Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth .• 365 U.S. 715. 722 (1961).
m Lu.gar, 457 U.S. at 936.
2t6 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (l988); see also
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary 8ch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 306 (200l) (Thomas.
J., dissenting) (describing these two aima of the state action doctrine as set forth in LUNar
a nd Tarkanian).
298 See, e.g., Paul Brest. SIaU! Action and Liberal Theory; A Casenole on Flagg Brothcl"Mv.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 13~O (1982) (arguing that the state action doctrinl! i~
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'private' action and what is 'state' action is not always easy to
determine."29? Yet the Court is entrenched in a formalistic
approach to state action that is devoid of broader constitutional
principles for steering the sorting process when it happens that the
public and private roles blur. Instead, it has deemed courts' role as
one of "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" in individual
cases,2gB leaving a dizzying array of outcomes with few common
threads. As a consequence, the doctrine mostly fails as such.
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court erected a two-part
analysis for implementing the dual purposes of the state action
doctrine,2g9 although it has only intermittently employed both
parts in subsequent cases. 300 The first prong-whether "the
[challenged] deprivation [was] caused by the exercise of some right.
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the State or by a person for whom the State is rcsponsible"ool-is
satisfied if the private actor, in effectuating a constitutional
deprivation, acted "with the knowledge of and pursuant to" a law,
person, or entity for which the state is responsible."o2 This fnctor
thus requires that the private actor's conduct be in conformity
with the rules of the state."03
The second part of the Lugar formulation does more doctrinul
work than the first. It asks whether "the party charged with the
deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said tu be a state
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intellectually inconsistent); John Dorsett Niles, Lauren g, Trihhle & .Iennirer M. Wims il il
Making Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. Rt:v. H8S, MR9 (2U1 1) ("l l) l l' V(·II'pil1 ~ a
comprehensive state action approach is impossible becRu~ the ~t nt (· Acliull ln11UJry c'fln
arise in limitJess factual situations and therefore defies definition.i.
291 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); see also Louis Michael Hmdmnn, 711(' Stalf'
Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMM ENT. 379, 391 (1 993) ("No Rrps of ('onRlltur ul1Iul Inw i ~
lUore oon fusing and contradiCtory than state action.").
298 Burton., 365 U.S. 8.t 722.
"" 457 U.s. nt 9~ 7.
See generally Bf'('nlwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 306 (Thoma .. , .J., diswnf.i ng) (l1ulinR fhnt
the Court has "used many different tests to IdentIfy :.t8te Rebon").
30 L Lugar, 457 U.s. at 937.
.~ Am. Mfl'S. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (H)9H) (qUill ing Flngg H nH~.• ft1l= v.
Bronks. 436 U.S. 149. 156 (I 97R».
:1113 In Lugar, a curporate defendant was sued for obtaining nnd (',,('cul in!.! 11 WI'if Ill'
attachment of the plaintiffs property pre·judgment. I.ugar, 457 U.s. at 9201 - 21l. 'I'hl' ('IlUrt
found slale action for purposes of the plaintiffs due process clalln, bu t not for fI dP 11Il
pl"Cm iaed on "unlawful acts" for which "respondents were R('ting conlrary III till' l'df!Va n l
policy articulated by the State," as they lacked "the authority of Htnl e nflk inlt-l to put Ihi'
:100
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actor."""4 For this step, the Court begins by identifying "the
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains."""5 Whether such
conduct should be held to constitutional standards is then
analyzed under two primary tests: (1) the "exclusive government
function" or "public function" test which, the Sixth Circuit has
explained, looks to whether "the private entity exercises powers
which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the state, such as
holding elections or eminent domain";'"6 and (2) the
"entanglement" test, which looks to whether the government
compelled, encouraged, authorized, facilitated, or participated in
private conduct. 307 Neither test relies on principles of the
structural Constitution-such as the separation of powers or
achieving government accountability-at any stage in the
analysis. As a result, neither operates in a way that could
conceivably capture the broader constitutional implications of
government outsourcing or the insourcing of data for surveillance.
The highly formalistic public function test has heen largely
confined to holding elections,308 empanelling juries,'''''' running

Id. at 937.
... Sul/iuan. 526 U.S. at 51 (quoting Blum v. Yareleky. 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
'" Wololeky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing ~'logg Bro•. Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149. 149 (1978); Jackeon v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U$ 345, 352 (1974»;
see also Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 157-62 (discussing the public function lest); Nixon v.
Condon. 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932) (recognil.ing that the test is satisfied whtm parties are
acting in matters "intimately connected with the capacity of government"),
.10 14

301 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PR I NCIPI~ES ANII PCH.IClF..H 529 (4th ed.

2011 ) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary S.,h. ABe'n. 531 U.S. 288 (2001)).
PmfeMsor Chemerinsky characterizes public function and entanglement 811 Mexceptions" to
th" ban on holding private actors constitutionally accountablt!. ld. He aJsa identifies R
possible third exception-"entwinement," whIch ie entanglement without government
em:uuragemcnt and ~prings from the Court's decision in Brentwood Academy. Id. Other
scholars have d~ye)oped taxonDmies of state action that divide the entanglement test into
mu ltiple Hcporate tests. See, e.g., Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State
Action Doctrine, 73 Mo. L. REV. 561, 564-67 (2008) (identifying seven tests for fltate action,
including the "state agency," the "joint participation," the "&tate compUlsion," and the
h~y m hi ClI ic: n!IRtionship" tesls).
Jody Freeman divides ~ntnngJentent into "joint
pllrtic:ipat.ion" nnd "ncxtlfl," with the latter governing circumstances in which the privRtt'
actor is heavily regulated. Freeman, supra note 42, at 577.
"" See 'ferry V. Adorn., 345 U.S. 461, 46S-70 (1953) (Black. ,J.. plurality) (applying tho
public fUl1ctinn tl!l'It Lo ,·II-ctions in which public OffiCU1)S ure seit!<:ted).
:109 See gdmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (holding that th~
exercisp of perem ptory challenges in civil cases is utnte actiun),
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municipalities,31D and (possibly) operating prisons. 311 Technically,
it is limited to circumstances in which the government delegates
"an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign" to a private entity,312 a
standard that the Court has not clarified except to hold that the
provision of education does not qualify.313 In Rendell-Baker v.
Kahn, the Court found that a private, nonprofit school was not a
state actor because the state legislature had given the executive
branch the option of providing educational services publicly;
education was thus not an "exclusive" function of the state.3 14
For its part, the "entanglement test" is not a true test, but an
amalgamation of considerations-some factual, some subjective."'5
They include (1) whether the government regulated or licensed the
private party, (2) whether the state exercised coercive power over
the private party, (3) whether the state encouraged or participated
in the private activity in question or otherwise had a "symbiotic
relationship" with the private party, and (4) whether the functions
and motivations of the private actor were at odds with those of the
government. 3lS In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, the
Court explained that this "nexus" inquiry "necessarily turns on the
degree of the Government's participation in the private party's
activities, a question that can only be resolved 'in light of all the
circumstances.' "317

:110

See Marsh v, AJabama. 326 U.S. 501. 505-06 (1946)

(hoJdin~

that town that was

wholly-owned by a corporation was a state actor).
:m See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997) (holding that privately employed
prison guards were notentlUed to qualified immunity under 42 U .S.C. § 1983, but reserving
the question of whether they acted under color of state law in the first instance).
312:

FJagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks. 436 U.S. 149, 160 (1978) (holding that warehousemen's

proposed sale of goods entrusted to him for soorage was nol a state action).

'" See Renden·Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (holding that .ducation of
maladjusted high school students is not the exclusive provmce of the state).
314 ld. Michele Gilman has thus observed that if the legislature allows functions Lo be
outsourced, "it is hard to see how a privatized service can ever satiafy this interpretation of
the public function test." Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountabtlity in an Era 0/

Priuatized Welfare. 89 CAUF. L. REV. 569, 614 (2001).

'I'

A1though scholars have subdtvided the entanglement approach into numeroUIJ distinct
tests for state action, see supra note 307, the Supreme Court has not formulated it thAt WAy.
See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary 8ch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001) ("Our
cases have identUied a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution.").
31t See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 307, at 539-51 (explainmg these and other
considerations to determine the "degree of government involvement" in the action).
317

489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971»

(citations omitted).
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The "totality-of-the-circumstances" nature of the entanglement
test has produced inconsistent results. The Court found no state
action in Rendell-Baker,'"" for example. in which employees sued a
nonprofit school after being terminated for engaging in political
speech,:Il" Even though the school received most of its funding
from the state, the Court reasoned. the rationale behind the firings
did not pertain to the educational purpose of the public function. 320
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Ass'n, in
contrast, the Court declared a private regulator of public high
school athletics a state actor by virtue of school officials'
"entwinement ... in the structure of the association," which was
comprised of public school officials and employees eligible for
membership in the state retirement system.32l In dissent, Justice
Thomas criticized the majority's finding of state action because the
association performed no public function; it was neither created,
controlled, or coerced by the state; and it fulfilled no government
objective. 32'2
The entanglement test incentivizes the government to hand off
immense discretion to private parties.323 The less the government
coerces or substantially involves itself in a private activity, the less
likely there will be state action and constitutional liability for
either party under the test, Indeed, the Supreme Court in Blum v.
Yaretsky pointed to the absence of coercion to justify rejecting a
state action argument in the face of other indicia of government
influence.:l 24 Blum involved a class of Medicaid recipients seeking
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m ulated it t hat way.
:88, 296 (200 1) C'Our
1 an attribution."},
Ling these and other
t he action),
U.S. 443, 487 (1971»
:.0

'" 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982).
rllil Id. at 831-35.
:I:!II Id. at 840-42.
'" 531 U.S. 288, 291, 300 (2001).
:L%1 ld. at 309-1 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
:J'L' S('(! Metzger, supra note 167, at 1424-26. In her exhaustive analysis of government
outsourcing under the state action doctrine. Gillian Metzger condudes that the test's
el:l~ntiul foculi on "close government involvement" fails to acoount for private parties acting
"as independent decision makers" under the auspices of government authority. [d. at 1424.
When government contractually delegates its powers to private parties and fails to retain
l"IufficiL'nt oversight or control, it "evisceratlesl the fundamental requirement of
com;titutionni nccou ntahility." [d. at 1422. ProfeAAor Metzger has therefore urged that the
focuR of state actlOn a nalysis "shift! I to assessing t he powers wielded by private entities and
"way from identify ing surreptitious government action," an intriguing approach that is not
OlU.i1y supportable by case law. [ d. at 1424.
31~ 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (explai ning that the government is "responsible fur :1
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or haR provided such signirkHlI1
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notice and an opportunity for II hCIIl"ing before a private nursing
home could transfer them 1.0 another facility.32' Although the state
subsidized the cost of the home. liclJnsed and extensively regulated
its operations, and paid for most patients' medical expenses, the
physicians and nursing home administrators ultimately made the
transfer decisions.!I?j; 'The decisions were not "require[d)" by the
state, so there was no stat.e action. s2 ?
The decision in Bu.rdeau v. McDowell328 similarly supports the
notion that the government can employ private parties to do what
it cannot constitutionally do unilaterally, so long as it distances
itself from the act in question. In Burdeau, the Supreme Court
rejected II criminal defendant's attempt to constitutionally
challenge prosecutors' use of books and papers received from a
private party who had stolen them.329 Because "no official of the
Federal Government had anything to do with the wrongful seizure
of the petitioner's property, or any knowledge thereof until several
months after the property had been taken from him," the seizure
was not attributable to the government. 330 Burdeau thus treats
the private and the public spheres as distinct: because a private
party-not the government-unlawfully took the defendant's
property, the Constitution does not apply to the government's use
of that material in a criminal prosecution. It also validates the
government's use of the private sector's extra-constitutional status
to achieve objectives it could not achieve on its own absent
constitutional scrutiny.
B. THE PRIVATE DELEGATION DOCTRINE

The private delegation doctrine offers a nother approneh to
limiting the government's ability to partner with the privatu Huctor
for purposes of engaging in government functions. including
encourage ment. either overt or covert, that t he choice must in low be dl ~ 'I1I. ·11 tu IN! IhJl Lor
t he State"}.
:t.u. ld. at 993,
:rJI! Id. at 994-96.
'" [d. at 1005. 1008-10.
"'" 256 U. S. 465 (192 1).
~J'II Id. at 475-76.
~ ld. at 475. The theory behind Burdeau coalesces with till' Ii'utt r lJl A IIII 1It11l 1l : 1lt'~ Ih irdparty doctrine to essentially insulate the government from cn n~ 1.1 1 III 11111 111 " Ol! It I l i nts 10 the
extent that it uses tht' pr ivate sector and its da ta to search ur n ' ~: 111111i PI'I\H It >III1Ji\' idunJa.
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surveillance. In theory, it insists that the powers vested by the
Cons titution in Congress must be exercised by that branch of
government and cannot be transferred elsewhere. a:.. Such a claim
featured prominently in post-New Deal litigation around the
propriety of the burgeoning administrative state.""l In Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court struck down a provision of thl'
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA):m that empowered the
President to manage a prohibition on interstate shipment of
petroleum on the grounds that Congress had set "no criterion to
govern the President's course."a.,· The Supreme Court has since
declined to apply the doctrine on the theory that Congress has
broad delegation authority so long as its enabling legislation
includes an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of
discretion.:"~· The Court's landmark decision in Chevron U.S.A,
Inc. v. Natural Reso!!rces Defense Counril. Inc. :l.16-w hich requires
courts to defer to agency constructions of ambiguous statutory
text'!37- effectively shores up Congress's authority to hand off
legislative power with vague directives to agencies charged with
administering a statute."'!"
Two cases challenging congressional attempts to delegate
legislative powers to private parties reached the Supreme Court
around the same time as Panama Refining, with similar results.
In A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. u. United States,:t19 the Court
held unconstitutional NIRA's authorization of private trade and
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:~11 .~t! Mistretta v. Uniwcl States, 4KH U.s. :UH, 371-72 (19M9) ("The nonc1e legotilln doct.rinH
is rooted in the principle uf !-IepRration rtf powers that underlies our tripartite system (If
Guvcl'Ilnlt'nl. ... Congre!S8 gem·rally tnnnut. c.lelegute iL.. )eg1Klntive puwer to IIllotlmr BI·Rm:h."

(citlllg FI!'lcl v. Clnrk, 14:3 U.s. (i49. 1i92 (l~92»)).
.1.11 gil.. A.L.A. Schechter Puult.ry Curp. v. Unitf'd Htalt~8, 295 U.s. 495, 5:17-:19. fi4~
(l9:Hj); Pun. Rt·f. Co. v. Ryan. :,m:i U.s. 3HH. ·'20-21, 44:!5-4:!H, 4:iO (19:ifi): Metzgt!r, tlllpru
null..> 167. Ilt 1437-45 (discussing nondclegat ion casel' in the Supreme Court folluwin.c thl ~
N('w Il,·nl) .
.., 15 U.K.!'. § 7U:I (2006).
:"\.'f.I PUll. Rl'{. Co.. 293 U.s. at 415.
i\.VJ Mu:lrelta, 4RH U.H. At 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, .Jr., & Cn. v. Unitttd Htatm., 276 U.H.

:m·t, ·HU) (I !J2H)).
1G7 LJ .H. ~ :J7, H4:J (HJH·I) .
.,1 Id .
,. Sf'€' HlChard J. Piert't~ . •11'., Cfwvnm and Its Aftf'rmath: .Judiriul Rcuif'U' of Ag,.""y
Illh'rpl'f'tutiIJlIS uf Stalutory PNJllisiollS, 41 VA~j). L. H,(o;v. aOI, aos (19HH) (calling the isslie of
CongresR dplc'gating with nmblgllOliH directives the "more controverRial point" in Chevron).
:lat 295 U.S. at 495.
rill

'ntin u!'llt 'N t hll'tl·
mRtrRintR to tilt'
tl' Individuals.
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industrial groups to draft codes of fair competition-subject to the
President's approval-for the sale of chickens."40 The legislation
violated the separation of powers because it enabled businesses
"[to] roam at will and the President [to] approve or disapprove
their proposal as he may see fit."341 Congress, the Court explained,
"is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential
legislative functions with which it is thus vested."342
In Carter Ii. Carter Coal Co.,"43 the Court again applied the
private delegation doctrine to strike down the Bituminous
Conservation Coal Act, which authorized coal miners and
producers to establish wages and maximum labor hours for mine
workers."" The statute required no governmental imprimatur
before the provisions took effect."'~ "This is legislative delegation
in its most obnoxious form," the Court wrote, "for it is not even
delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and
often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business."346 Grasping for a public-private dividing line, the Court
reasoned that "[t]he difference between producing coal and
regulating its production is, of course, fundamental. The former is
a private activity; the latter is necessarily a governmental
function ...."3'7
Since the New Deal cases, the Supreme Court has consistently
upheld delegations to agencies and private parties alike. 34 " Thus,

am Id. at 521- 23 & n.4. 542.
Id. at 5.18.
:~12 Id. at 529.
,., 298 U.S. 2 38 (1936).
'" Id. at 278, 31G-II.
:W~ Id. at 310.
:~I(\ I d. at. 3 11 . The Court further suggested that the delegation viola ted due process by
allowing private parties to regulate competltors. [d , This argument is problematiC to the
extent that it applies procedura l due process protections to a ICgJslative versus a djudicative
all

decision. Bee Bt·Metallic Inv. Co. v. Stnte Ed. of Equa lIzation. 239 U.s. 441, 445-46 (1915)
" 8 genera l determination" affecting R IRrge number of people in unexceptional
waYI:I lS not bound by due process).
'" Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.
3-IK See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assocs ., 531 U.S. 457, 472-74 (2001) (holding that
the phrase, "requisite to protect the pubhc health," was sufficiently deter minate til guide
the EPA's establishment of nabona l ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air
Act); Cumn v. Wallace, 306 U.S. I, 15-16 (1939) (upholding statute requiring two·thirds of
regulated industry to approve regulations before they could take effect); Sunshine
(holding that
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as Jody Freeman has observed, "[r]esurrecting the nondelegation
doctrine to invalidate private delegations on the theory that some
'public' functions are nondelegable would ... require heavy
conceptual lifting."3.9 Yet she and others have called private
delegations more troubling "than the broadest delegations to
public agencies."350 If private delegations were not especially
noxious, Carter Coal would call into question the propriety of
legislative delegations to administrative agencies-and thus the
viability of the federal regulatory state itself. In its present form,
the private delegation doctrine does not answer the threshold
question of whether the Constitution can be read to ban the
outsourcing of legislative power to private parties, however
defined, while preserving the rule making function of modern
executive branch agencies.
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C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

In litigation pending across the country, the primary doctrinal
battleground for challenging the NSA's use of third-party data for
surveillance has been the Fourth Amendment, rather than the
state action or private delegation doctrines. 361 This stands to
reason. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he overriding
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."3' 2 In
Mapp u. Ohio, the Court went so far as to characterize it as
establishing a "right to privacy, no less important than any other
right carefully and particularly reserved to the people."3s3 The
Fourth Amendment grew out of the Framers' concern "that
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 388, 393 (1940) (upholding s tatute that
allowed coal indus try members to fix prices in accordance with statutory standards),
:wg Freeman. supra note 42, at 584,
:Il1O Jd.
at 583-84 (citing Harold J. Krent. Pragmerlling the Unitary ExecutilJe:
Congressional Delegations o{ Admi"istraliue Authority Outside the Federal Gouernment, 85
Nw. U. L. R ~N. 62, 69 n.17 (1990); David M. Lawrence, The Priuate Exercise 0/ Gouernmenlai
POWl!r, 61 INn. L.J. 647, 649-50 (1986».
:\Ii I See NSA Surueillonre Lawsllit Tracher, PnoPUBLICA, http://projects.propllblica.orWgl·lIl'
hicslsurveillance ·suitS#Jn%20ro%20N ational%2OSecurity%20Letter%202011 (last visit(td "\ -1.
22, 20 15) (listing pending cases). As noted preVlously, this Article does not anuly;/,I' Ihu
statutory, First Amendment or due process challenges to NSA surve illance programR.

"" Schmerber v. California, 394 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
'" 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (emph•• i. added).
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lIuthority of 'general warrants' were .. . immediate evils" t.o he
avoided by, first, "protecting the basic right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures" and, second, "requiring that
warrants be particular and supported by probable cause."3M
Originally construed as the physical invasion of a person or
property, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
occurs "when the government violates a Bubjective expectation of
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable."3" The reasonable
expectation of privacy trigger is a tricky means of confining the
government's collection and use of third party data for
surveillance, however. The reason for this mirrors the problem
plaguing the state action and private delegation doctrines: the
illusion that the public and private spheres are severable for
purposes of constitutional law. In essence, prevailing Fourth
Amendment doctrine treats the existence of a third party
intermediary as a waiver of constitutional protections, in two
ways. First, the Court has long declared that "[wJhat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.""'· Thus, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned property, like
garbage left out for collection,357 or in the movements of an
automobile on public thoroughfares,"" because it is available for
members of the public to view."'"
Second, the Court has repeatedly held that "the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government

x'"' Yuytnn v. Nt!w York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-64 (1980). The FOUl1 h Anwndlllt'nl PI'UVUil!H thut
ftJhe right of the people to he secure in their pt!THOI1H, hnuscH, papers. lind
dfecttl, ugomsl um'casonable searches and seizureH, sha ll not be vinlated,
nnd no WarmntR shall issue, but upon probabJp CIIUSt', I-Iullponed hy ORlh
nffirmntion. and particularly descnbing the plnre t.o ho Resl'Cht'rl, and thl'
Jl<'rlmns nr thingA to he Aei7.ed.
U.H. {'(}Nh'1', amend. IV.
:It,i. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-33 (200l).
A H,,-a rch nIHil o(:<:urM If then' is
phYflical trespass. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.R 438, 4fi6 ( IH2.R), OIN'rru/c'd III
1"'" by Katz v. United States, 389 U.s. 347 (1967); Sergor v. Npw York. aRR U.s. 4\ (HI67).
IJI'

'"' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S .•147, 351 (1967).
,L'oI

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).

"" United Sta ••• v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1911:1).
:t6'J ld. at 281-82.
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authorities.","m 'rhe Court has thus found no Fourth Amendment
ban on the use of information obtained through government
informants.'"H Most notably, it found in Smith v. Maryland that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers
dialed""' because callers "voluntarily convey numerical information
to thn phone company and 'expose[]' that information ... in the
ordinary course of business."363 Providing tax documents to an
accountant
similarly
relinquishes
Fourth
Amendment
a64
protections.
The Court has held that bank customers have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in records "contain[ing] only
information voluntarily conveyed ... and exposed to [bank]
employens in the ordinary course of business."365 Nor is the Fourth
Amendment violated if a physician provides the state with copies
of medical information. 36G
With the advent of the Internet, some lower courts have applied
tho third party doctrine to authorize warrantless government
acceRS to shared computer files, information sent or received
through the Internet and stored on a third party server,367 and
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,IW Ullitl.d ~tales v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401
U.s. 745. 752 (1971); Hoffa v. Untted States. 385 U.S. 293. 302 (1966); Lopez v. United
Sla tt'H. :17:3 U.s. 427, 437-39 (1963», The Supreme Court has also held that "8 party
il1<Timi nntmi by ('vidence produced by a th ird party sustains no violation of his own Fifth
AUH'ndmcnt rights," CuI. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974) (citing Johnson v.
Ull il ed SLules . 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913); Couch v. United States. 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973».
Hence. the Fifth Amendment does not protect against subpoenas for a person's records and
pa pHrs heM by third parties. COZlch, 409 U.S. at 328, 333-35.
;1(11 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1971); see also Hoffa v. United States,
:!H5 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (no }4'ourth Amendment protection for conversations with a
culleague who turns out to be a government agent); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,
:l I 1 ( l Ho£)) (same regarding interactions with secret agent sent by the government to
pUl'chase narcotics from defendant); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 437-39 (same regarding agent's use
nf t!iect.ronic rm~ordmg pquipment).
'" Smith v. Maryland. 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979).
:11;:1 [d. at 744 .
:1111 Cmu'h, .to9 U.H. at 335-36.
:11~ Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 728-32 (1980)
(holding that a criminal defendant had no standing to suppress documents mega11y seized
frllm a' bridi.'8se (Jf an officer of a Bahamian bank because he had no privacy interest in
till'llI); Gal, Ba1/kers Ass'n, 416 U.s. at 54 (holding that regulatory mandates that banks
keep customer records for government scrutmy did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
"'" Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589. 604 n.32 (1977).
:161 .JUl1khi P. Semitsu, Frain Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking
PrilJac,Y RiRhts RevolulLOnized Onlme Government Surueillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291, 338 &
nn.li 1>l-l'i5 (201 1) (citing cases).
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individual subscriber information from an ISP.!lGH In the words of
the Ninth Circuit, the rationale is that "computer surveillance
techniques that reveal the toIfrom addresses of e-mail messages,
the IP addresses of websites visited and the total amount of data
transmitted to or from an account ... are constitutionally
indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that the Court
approved in Smith."3."
Lower courts are also split on the question of whether the third
party doctrine enables the government to capture electronic
information about an individual's location at a specific time-such
as cell phone tower data-without a warrant. Following the Third
Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Davis held that
the Fourth Amendment applies to cell phone location information
because" 'a cell phone customer has not "voluntarily" shared his
location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful
way'" and is likely "'(unJaware that . .. cell phone providers
collect and store historical location information.' "370 The court
rejected the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit,371 which had previously
applied Smith to find no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell
phone records on the rationale that "(cJell phone
users ... understand that their service providers record their
location information when they use their phones at least to the

!'It~ See, c.g., United States v. Perrine. 618 F.3d 1196. 1204 (lOth Cir. 2008) (noting also that
"[eJvery federal court to address thleJ issue has held t hat subscnber information ... (from an
ISP] is not protected by the Fourth Amendmentl ) . . ,"); !We also Semitsu, supra note 367, at
3.18 n.l86 (20 11) (citing cases).
)00 United States Y. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007).
The Sixth Circuit in
Wars/iak 1I. Uruted Stales reached t he opposite cnncluslon, although the decision was
vacated on other grounds. 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding t hat a sender of
electron ic mall has a reasonable expectatlon of prIVacy in messages residing WJth an ISP).
II(l('al"..d in. part, 532 F.3d 521 , 525-26 (6th Clr. 2008) (en bane) (finding t hat the question
whether govern ment should be enjoyed from searchmg cri mmal suspect's e·ma ils without a
warrant was not ripe).
". 754 f'.3d 1205. 1217 (11th Cir. 2014). reh 'g /lranled. 573 Fed. App'x 925 (2014) (quoting
III re Application of U. S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elee. Comm'n Servo to Disclose
Recs. to Gov'e. 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Clr. 2010» ; sec also In. re Application of U.S. for an
Order Authorizing t he Release of Historical Cell·Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1 VJ, 119-20
(E.D.N.Y. 201 1) (concluding that a law enforcement request for ce1l SIte informa tion raises
even greater privacy concerns than inst&Ha tion of a GPS device on n w lm:11' hecause "ceJl·
site· location records ... enable 'ma ss' or 'wholesale' electronic sllrvl~i lln nct '" of the "vast
majority of Americans").
'" Dauis, 754 F.3d at 1211- 12, 1217.
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same extent landline users in Smith understood that the phone
company recorded the numbers they dialed,"372
Another open question is whether Smith bars Fourth
Amendment scrutiny of the NSA's data surveillance programs. In
Klayman u. Obama,"73 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia concluded that "the relationship between the NSA and
telecom companies [has] become so thoroughly unlike those
considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that a
precedent like Smith simply does not apply:'374 In contrast, in an
opinion that was vacated on other grounds, the Southern District
of New York construed Smith as strictly holding "that individuals
have 'no legitimate expectation of privacy' regarding the telephone
numbers they dial because they knowingly give that information to
telephone companies."37.
Together with the state action doctrine and the private
delegation doctrine, the Fourth Amendment's third party doctrine
leaves open the question whether the Constitution can be
meaningfully invoked when the government outsources its
responsibilities to the private sector-either overtly or by
capturing private sector surveillance for its own use. The next
Part maps out a method for constitutionalizing how the
government structures its reliance on the private sector for its own
functions.376
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Scholars have recognized that prevailing constitutional doctrine
has left technology-related privacy protections largely in the hands
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'" 957 ~'. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 201 3).

;11·1 Id. at :U.
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of legislators and regulators. 377 But legislative responses to the
government's increasing reliance on the private sector should not
evolve in a constitutional vacuum. Viable arguments exist for
reworking existing constitutional doctrine to require that the
government structure its outsourcing and data insourcing
programs so as to preserve its own accountability to the people?7"
A. PRESUMPTIONS AND THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION

Commentators briskly debate the need for and proper approach
to legislative reform of surveillance laws,379 and strong arguments
exist for leaving privacy protections to Congress. Judges lack the
technological expertise to understand the full implications of a
Fourth Amendment case within a vast array of rapidly evolving
technologies and, in understanding them further, are constrained
by the arguments and evidence presented to them by lawyers. 3BO
Courts are also confined to operate within outdated doctrinal
rules. Legislatures and regulators, by contrast, can seek input
from experts on a macro level, unrestrained by the facts and issues
in a particular case.""! They are more procedurally flexible than
courts, and thus capable of responding to technological change
more swiftly and adeptly.oR2
Without a constitutional anchor to drive further reforms,
however, legislative solutions to the problems associated with
outsourcing and data insourcing remain dependent on the
377 See Kerr. supra note 138, at 630 ("Congress haR responded to this constitutional vacuum
with a series of laws that offer relatively strong (although hardly perfect) legislative privacy
protections."),
:1711 In the aftermath of the Snowden flCsndal, outraged politicians, thp. ACLU,
telecommunications companies, and concerned citIzens have invoked the courts to obtain
constitutional redress for perceived overreaching by the NSA despite the statutory hackdrop
to its odium•. NSA S urveillance Lawsuit Tracker, silpra note a51.
379 See, e.g., Kerr, .<;upra note 13B, at 638-42 (arguing that criticisms of the USA PA'rRIOT
Act's pen register amendments Rre misplaced).
AAO See RilE'Y v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497-98 (2014) (Alita, J., concurring)
("Legislatures, cledcd by the people, are in a better position than we are to assess and
respond to the changes t.hat have already occurred Rnd those that almost certainly will take
place in the future ."): Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitlltion.al Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 807 (2004) (arguing
that Congress-and not the courts interpreting the Constitution-is a better responder to
the privacy threats of emerging technologies).
3111 Kerr, supra note 380, at 807- 08.

"" Id.
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providence of political coalitions and congressional will. The
Constitution is not so fickle. Its importance as a backstop for
legislative protections of important rights like privacy derives from
the structure of the national government. AIl Judge J . Harvie
Wilkinson III of the Fourth Circuit has observed, "[i)f the courts
are to function as interpreters of constitutional rights, they must
necessarily function as arbiters of constitutional structure."~83
James Madison understood this, explaining in The Federalist No.
10 tha t the "proper structure of the Union" operates to protect
minorities from dangerous factions.~4 The Supreme Court has
relied on the Constitution's structure-as distinct from its
enumerated government functions and provisions enshrining
individual rights-to uphold states' immunity from suit,385 the
President's appointment power,385 limits on federal control of state
law enforcement officers,'B1 and Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause,388 to name only a few examples. 3BY
One such principle of constitutional structure is the
found ational assumption that the government is accountable to
the people. S'" Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 49 that "the
people are the only legitimate fountain of power."391 In The
Federalist No. 78, he argued that legislative acts "contrary to the
Constitution" are invalid because "[t)o deny this, would be to
affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the
servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people
are superior to the people themselves."392 The Supreme Court has
consistently reinforced the notion that government exercises only
delegated powers channeled from the people through the
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:1Il1 Tm: Fl':UF.RAJ.IST No. 10, at 4'7- 53 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2(09).
"'.; Alden Y. Maine, 527 U.S. 706. 713 (1999) .
... ~'r"y t. ~ Y. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 870, 878 (1991).
'" Prin tz Y. Unit ed States, 521 U.S. 898. 935 (1997).
:U!M Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth ., 469 U.S. 528, 555- 56 (1985).
:1II!l ,'Jet! J!cll t!rally Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constituti<' )fl, 99 VA. L. R ~:v .
1435, 144:1-48 (2013) (describing structural const itutional 1itigation in federal court).
:lWIJ Sef~ ~nerally Brown. supra note 8, at 456-57 (proposing a constitutional accountabili ty
ciuC'l ri nc th at woul d t.et.her the exercise of Cederal power to the people).
~9 1 'riff': }o'Em mAI.lST No. 49, supra note 384, at 256 (James Madison).
,'V,r~ '['m : FJ.:m :M I.lfoo'1' NO, 78, supra note 384, at 393 (James Madison).
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Constitution.3!)'1 Accountability and the idea of government by the
people are inextricable: because the people retain the ultimate
power of government, those who hold public power must be
accountable to the populace. Likewise, in order for there to be
accountability under our Constitution, the source of federal
power-the people---must have some say in its exercise.
Under outsourcing regimes, the relational hierarchies that exist
within a government bureaucracy and constitutional democracy
are replaced by the happenstance of contractual terms. Private
contractors are consequently less accountable to the voting public
than government actors functioning within the umbrella of the
executive branch and under an ongoing threat of judicial review. 394
Blind spots in applicable laws keep the scope of the government's
access to private sector surveillance data beyond public view,
compromising voters' ability to hold legislators and the executive
branch accountable. 395 The viability of a political solution also
depends on a functioning Congress, the relative priority of other
"... See McCulloch v. Maryl and, 11 U.S. 316. 403 (1819) ("rho government proceed.
directly (rom the people: is 'ordained and established' in the nalll(! of the people ....");
Downes v. Bidwell. 182 U.S. 244. 359 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) ("[NJo utterance of
this court has intimated a doubt that in its operation on the people, by whom and for whom
it was established, the national government i8 a government of ,mumera ted powers, the
exercise of which is restricted to the use of means approprill t.c: nn cl plainly adapted to
constitutional ends. and which are 'not prohibited, but consist with t he letter and spirit of
the Constit ... non:" (quoting McC"lloch, 17 U.S. aL 421»; Hnwkl! v. Rmit h, 253 U.S. 221,
226-27 (1920) ("[tJhc Constitution of the United States waH ordnirmd hy the people," who
"grant" authority to Congress, and "Ji1t is not the function of t:nurl.H or legislative bodies,
national or state. to a lter the method which the Constitution hn~ tilCl'fI"); U. S. Ter m Limits,
lnc. v. Thorton. 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) ("mhe Framers, in perh" ll!"! Uwir most important
contribution, conceived of a Federal Governmen t d irt.'c liy n !HIIUnHihk· to the people,
poss essed of direct power over the people, and chosen diredly, nol hy S tn tes. but by the
people."); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (HIS:!) ("WIIl ~ 1I a ny Brunch ncts, it is
presumptively exercising the power the Constitution h lni ddt'J,.:nh,d In il.. "): Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (.Jm~hlll1 • •1•• 1'(IIll'lIITj n ~) ("rrlhe
Federal Government a s a whole, possessea only delcgntl!Cl IHIWI ~ rtl. 'I'lIt! JlurlKIAC of the
Constitution waf not only to grant power, but to kecl' il. rnllH ~d iillg nut fir hnnd.";
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (relyin g on t hc (:l!ItYMhll rJ.: AcldrcHS fnrmu lation
of "government of the people, by the people, for t he people" til cUlIHI.il.utiull ully require
roughly equal representation of voters in state legislative riist.rids); II"tlmr Y. VII . Hf.nte Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (observing t hat in Ue.1'lIulds I hi' COUl'1 nolt!tI t hat the
Equal Protection Clause "is an essential part of the con('t!lIl. nr n ~nV~'I'I1I1H'11 1. III' Inws li nd not
men" and "is at the beart of Lincoln's vision of 'govcrnn14!111. (If I II~' 11j ~ I)lh · . lIy IIII' Jll'Ople,
rand] for the people' · (quoting Reynolds, 371 U.S .• t 56R)).
3tl-4 See Brown, supra note 191, at 1351-52.
395 See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying tex t.
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issues competing for political attention, and the power of
interested lobbying groups to influence the legislative process. 396
Such factors have little bearing on the legitimacy of the privacy
concerns created by the expansion of data-related surveillance and
as a consequence the concerns are left unaddressed.
Importantly, privacy rights are not grounded in Congress's
discretionary exercise of its constitutional powers-but in the
Constitution itself. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
the Bill of Rights reflects the Framers' concern for protecting
specific aspects of physical privacy,:m such as privacy of speech
and assembly (First Amendment);398 privacy of the home against
demands that it be used to house soldiers (Third Amendment);399
privacy of the person and possessions against unreasonable
searches (Fourth Amendment);'OO and informational privacy (Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).-ol
Under prevailing doctrine, however, the private nature of the
government's data source dictates whether constitutional privacy
guarantees apply to surveillance conducted using that data. 402
The government can effectively hide behind the private sector's
extra-constitutional status and evade accountability for an
unprecedented level of prying. The same phenomenon holds true
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19fj See Matthew A. Cahn. Tile Players: Institutional and Nonirutitutwnal Actors in the
Policy Process, in PUBJ.IC PoLICY: THE EssENTIAL READINGS 201-11 (SleUa Z. TheodouJou &
Matthew A. Cahn eds., 1995) (indicating that the political process is much more complicated
than it appears, involves a number of actors, and that "(t]he role each actor plays, in
combination with the relationship between actors in both policy bureaucracies, is what
ultimately determines policy outcomes;.
3$17 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing a right to decisional
privacy on the theory that "the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from t.hose guarantees that help give them life and substance," and
that some of those guarantees "create zones of privacy'1; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599
n.25 (1977) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484, in a Fourth Amendment context); Cal.
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Financial
transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs. At some
point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of
privacy."). In subsequent decisions, the privacy right has come to encompass matters such
as child rearing, procreation, and termination of medical treatment as a matter of due
proceSH. & e Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (listing the cases that hn\lj ~
protected activities on the grounds of privacy).
:m U.S. CON~"'. amend. I.
:19& Id. amend. III.
<tOO [d. amend . TV.
4111 [d. amend. V.
...02 See supra notes 1~18 and accompanying text.
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for government outsourcing. Decisions to outsource are mnde
without constitutional restraint, and once a function is outsourced,
the Constitution does not apply to confine how private parties
carry it out. Constitutional accountability should instead operate
as a structural principle that limits how government outsourcing
and data insourcing occurs, shifting courts away from the public·
versus-private focus that has stagnated evolution of the law to
date. Such a functional principle of constitutional accountability is
already at play in state action, private delegation, and Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
B. STATE ACTION AS A DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

State action doctrine is ostensibly a means of holding private
actors accountable for constitutional violations.'oa It is a quasijurisdictional doctrine that helps define the breadth of the
Constitution's reach when it comes to government actions taken in
tandem with the private sector.'O' The substantive obligations
enforced via the state action doctrine come from the substance of
the Constitution itself.,o5 As currently applied, the state action
doctrine is an "all-or-nothing approach."·o6 A private actor is a
state actor under the doctrine for all purposes, including financial
liability for damages to individual constitutional rights.407 If the
state action doctrine were softened to recognize that public-private
relationships operate on a continuum,'os with no clear line dividing
the public and the private sectors, it could be recalibrated to
prompt a narrower remedy in appropriate cases, i.e., an order

.os See Metzger, sup ra note 167. at 1410 ("State action doctrine remaim; thp. primary tunl

courts use to ensure that private actors do not wiel d government power outMitit,
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ccmstitutionnl constraints.").
40( See id. at 1501 (noting that the current doctdne targets government involv('lnpnt or
pers uasive entwinement with private actors).
406 See Ki mberly N. Brown. Governmpnt b.Y Contract and the Strltcturol (oll.';t jllltirm, H7
NOTRJo: DAM ..; L. REV. 49 ] , 504 (2011) (noti ng that the doctri nt' asks when "privati· purlil'lt
8hou ld he treated as government actors" ond "s usceptible to liability fol' violutiol1'4 flf
individual consti tullonal rights").
·ICle Metzger, sup ra note 167, at 1431 & n.223.
~07 See id. ("If state action is found, constitutional requirements directly apply in full ftln'c'
to the private entity.").
·10" See Brown, supra note 405, at 607-12 (arguing that pubhc'priVHtt! n!lnl ionshiru; fnll un

" constitutional continuum).
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directing that the government structure outsourcing relationships
in ways that ensure government accountability.
In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil CO.,40. the Court described the state
action doctrine's twin aims as preserving private autonomy and
freedom and relieving the state of responsibility for conduct that
the state cannot control. 410 The Court identified the first question
in a state action analysis as whether "the deprivation [was] caused
by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by
a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the
State is responsible."4Il The second factor-whether "the party
charged with the deprivation ... may fairly be said to be a state
actor"-exists because, "[w]ithout a limit such as this, private
parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to
rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the
community surrounding them."412
The Lugar formulation accordingly hinges on a determination
that unconstitutional conduct is, in the first instance, t he product
of some activity for which the state is responsible. Ultra vires
action by a private party is not state action. By the same token,
the test "avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials,
responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be
blamed."4l3
In Lugar, a private party used a prejudgment attachment
procedure to secure property in satisfaction of a debt. 414 The
procedure required only an ex parte petition that the creditor
bel ieved that the owner might dispose of the property to defeat his
creditors. 416 The debtor sued the creditor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that it had acted jointly with the state to deprive him of
due process. 4 '6 The Court dismissed the count of the complaint
challenging the creditor's "malicious" and "wanton" acts because
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... 457 U.s . 922 (1 982).
I UJ [d. at 936 (advocating "careful ndherencp" to t.he doctriOl' to nchipve these aims).
au ld. at m17.
l l~

[d.

~ 13

Id. at 93ft

-II t fd. at 924.
m fd. (describing the prejudgment attachment procedure requirement).
H I; fd. at 925. The Court held that the state action mquiry 18 idenucnllu IIii'
ur !ll ute la w" m qu iry for purposes o f § 1983. [d. at 9 35.
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they were not attributable to the state.·!? As for the claim that the
prejudgment attachment procedures themselves were insufficient,
however, the creditor was a state actor.·!" The Court explained:
"While private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct
that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created
by the statute obviously is the product of state action ...·!" Thus, it
concluded, "Petitioner did present a valid cause of action under
§ 1983 insofar as he challenged the constitutionality of the
Virginia statute...•20 By contrast, in Moose Lodge No. 107 u.
Iruis,42! a private club's refusal to serve an Mrican-American was
not attributable to the state by virtue of a regulatory scheme
enforced by the state liquor board because "there [wa)s no
suggestion ... that the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations
governing the sale of liquor [we]re intended either overtly or
covertly to encourage discrimination."'"
In the traditional public service contract scenario, the
government has levers of control over private contractors that it
can employ if it so chooses. It can require stiffer contract terms to
derme and restrict a contractor's responsibilities or outline
meaningful consequences in the event of a breach. 423 Or it can
impose additional regulatory requirements on the contracting
process, such as APA-type procedures and FOIA transparency.'2'
If the remedies available under the state action doctrine were
recalibrated to require that the gouernment structure its
relationships with the private sector in ways that protect the
public interest, there could be pressure on government-through
the courts-to remedy problems with compliance and
accountability in creative ways.

Id. a t 940 .
ld. at 940-42.
4 '&1 Id. at 941.
420 ld. at 942.
'" '07 U.S. 163 (1972).
422 [d. at 164-65, 173; see also Lugar. 457 U.S. at 937-38 (distinguishing Moose Lodge
.U 7
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The opInIOn in SlIinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n· 25
demonstrates how the state action doctrine might operate to
prompt injunctions requiring that the government structure
outsourcing relationships to establish lines of constitutional
accountability. In SlIinner, labor groups brought suit to enjoin
regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) that authorized railroads to conduct drug and alcohol
testing on employees. 42" The FRA argued that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply because private railroads were
responsible for implementing the regulatory provisions on testing,
which were not mandatory.427 The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that "[a] railroad that complies with the ... regulations
does so by compulsion of sovereign authority, and the lawfulness of
its acts is controlled by the Fourth Amendment ...•28 Thus, the
Court found state action even though the tests were not
compulsory:'2!) Although it found no Fourth Amendment violation
on the merits, the Court indicated that the case could have been
resolved by requiring the government to include greater
protections for railroad workers in its implementing regulations.
On the facts before it, the Court reasoned. enjoining the
government to add a regulatory warrant requirement "would add
little to the assurances of certainty and regularity already afforded
by the regulations, while significantly hindering, and in many
cases frustrating, the objectives of the Government's testing
program."430 The Court's underlying premise, consistent with the
Lugar formulation, was that the government could have been
directed as a matter of the state action doctrine to properly dictate
the terms of the private party's service-terms that it could
control.
Similarly, in Blum v. Yaretsky,431 the Court could have directed
the state to amend its regulations bearing on private nursing
homes to avoid violations of constitutional rights. In Blum,
Medicaid recipients challenged private decisions to transfer or
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discharge them, arguing that they were entitled to notice ami H
hearing as a matter of due process.<32 The Court found no state
action because the decisions to transfer or discharge "ultimately
turn[edJ on medical judgments made by private parties according
to professional standards."433 An order enjoining the state to
amend its regulations to provide notice and a hearing prior to a
transfer or termination decision-an action over which the state
has control under the Lugar rationale for the state action
doctrine-would not have disturbed the private actors' ability to
exercise their professional discretion. 434 Hence, Blum coalesces
with the idea that the state action doctrine could be applied to
"find[ I public accountability in the circumstances...... On this
theory, plaintiffs suing the government for injunctive relief could
seek an order forcing it to alter the terms of its outsourcing
relationships to ensure accountability for the exercise of its
functions.· s•
By way of example, suppose that DHS enters into a contract
with Booz Allen to "assist Homeland Security in developing a biodefense and health-preparedness infrastructure to ensure the
security of the nation."437 Suppose further that the contract
specifically directs Booz Allen to develop training and security
protocols for United States medical personnel in the event of a
~3Z

Id. at 995-96.
l d. at 1008.
~ :u See id. at 1008-09 (analogizing the medical professionals' discretion to thnt of a public
defender); Gilman, supra note 314, at 612- 17 (arguing that requiring the statt! in Blum to
. 33

change the regulations to provide Cor notice and a hearing would be more consistt'nt wi th
the purposes of the state action doctrine than the Court's finding of no Rtatc actinn).
~ 3! Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n. 53 1 U.s. 28A, :lO:l (2001). TIlt'
Court in Brentwood Academy noted that "[e]ven facts that suffice to show puhlic HctlOn (or.
standing alone. would require such a fi nding) may be outweighed in the nAme nf Nome valur
at oddR with finding public accountability in the circumstancttl:l," id., ..uch LUI Lht! public
defender'~ need to retain an adversarial posture vis·a·vis the State, id. nt :)04 (ciling Polk

Cty. v. Dodson. 454 U.S. 312. 323 n.3 (1981».
~ 36 Whether plaintiffs wou ld have Article I II ~tandin K to HUP. fo r RUt~h an injuuction iN UII
important quefltion that is beyond the scopt! Df this Artiell!. Nor d~ s thiN Artidl~ mh.Jrl':<t;
tht> intersections with the law governing facial versus os·uppl iml l'Unstitu tiollnl chnlll'n ~(! H
to statutes and regulations. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Chull('n ges lu State and Ped('ral
Statutes. 46 STAN. 1... RKV. 235, 239 (1994) (observing that the bAr for t>ur.t'e<!diI1Kon a fHcinl
chalJenge is higher than for as-applied challenges).

m Homeland Security, Booz ALLEN, http://www.boozallen.com/consu ltnntskivilian-govern
mentlhomeland-security-ronsultingldhs.stralegy-technology.manugc-ml'nt (Jm~t ViHik.>d ""eh. 2.1.
2015).
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bioterrorist attack involving an infectious disease pathogen such
as the pneumonic plague. Booz Allen's protocols ultimately
exclude a certain class of health care workers from first-line
antibiotic treatment in the event of a mass exposure. Janet
Schmendrick is a hospital attendant who would not be eligible for
the first round of antibiotic treatments under Booz Allen's
protocols. She sues DHS and Booz Allen for an injunction
mandating revision of the protocols. 43s
Janet's substantive
constitutional claim is that the existing protocols violate equal
protection, as the vast majority of workers affected are women. '1'0
be sure, Booz Allen exercises discretion in devising the protocols,
much like the medical personnel in Blum. 4:19 Under the prevailing
construction of state action, therefore, the suit against Booz Allen
could be dismissed on the grounds that Booz is a private actor that
is not operating under the compulsion of the state. On a
constitutional accountability approach to state action, however,
Janet could rely on Skinner and the first prong of the Lugar test to
argue that, for purposes of her facial challenge,440 Booz is a state
actor functionin g pursuant to government directives, which DHS
should amend to conform to the Equal Protection Clause. The
state action doctrine's objective of protecting Booz Allen from
liability for money damages is no longer at stake if the all-ornothing approach to state action is revised to limit the relief
available to Janet. 44 ' Nor is there a viable concern that the
government will be held liable for conduct it cannot control.
The Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer4 4' is particularly
instructive for purposes of evaluating how a repackaging of state
action remedies might apply to data insourcing. Suppose again that
Janet Schmendrick separately sues the NSA along with a host of
private companies for an injunction imposing mandatory protocols
regarding how her personal data is collected, used, stored, and
shared. Fearing that she is being constantly tracked, Janet raises a
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1111 .~·('e supra notp.!o! 42o-:m nnd H('t:O mpanying text.
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'1\ '1'0 bH sure, whether it would he appropriate and advisable to recalihrate the state
action doctrine to enable a continuum of possible relief requires further thought, including
an ana lysis of wh at l ~ v(! J of sta te involvement would trigger the full panol>ly of money
damages.
'" :l:l4 U.H. 1 (1948).
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host of possible constitutional theories, such as equal protection
(arbitrary surveillance), the First Amendment (chilled speech and
association rights), the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable general
Amendment
(informational
warrant),
and
the
Fifth
privacy).·43 Janet might use Shelley to argue that, for purposes of
obtaining injunctive relief, the government's use of her data
transformed its collection by the private sector into state action. In
Shelley, the Court held that judicial enforcement of private
covenants restricting the sale of property to Caucasians was state
action even though the covenants were voluntarily entered into by
private parties: "It is clear that but for the active intervention of the
state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power,
petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in
question without restraint."'" The Court invalidated lower court
judgments enforcing the covenants, finding that they violated equal
protection. 44 6 Thus, the relief granted was essentially injunctivenon-enforcement of a lower court jUdgment.
Janet might justify her request for injunctive relief on the
theory that state action exists because the NSA's use of her data
caused her constitutional deprivation. Although the government
sourced the data from private parties who collected it from her
voluntarily, these factors-private action devoid of government
compulsion-existed in Shelley ...6 In effect, such an analysis
subsumes the second prong of the Lugar formation (i.e., is the
private actor a state one) within the first (i.e., whether the
deprivation was caused by the State). The second prong's purpose
of protecting private parties from constitutional liability for money
damages when they rely on rules of the State loses its
resonance. 447 Instead, the state action doctrine would highlight an
objective that is implicit in the first prong of Lugar: ensuring that
the government does not evade its constitutional obligations on the
pretense that the public and private sectors are severable for
·143 This Article takes no position on the viability or st rength of these theories beyond th('
}t'ourth Amendment discussion contained herein.
·.401 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
H " Id. at 20.
44 6 See id. at 4-6 (describing the restrictive covenants adopted by private parties).
01017 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (stating that the two principles
"collapse into each other when the claim of constitutional deprivation is directed against a
party whose official character is such as to lend the weight of the state to his decisions;.
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To be sure,
purposes of the structural Constitution.
superimposing state action on a private party whose data is
insourced into government coffers significantly stretches the state
action from its current doctrinal posture.448 But its potential for
imposing constitutional limits on big data surveillance activity
that surely warrants such boundaries is formidable.
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C. THE PRIVATE DELEGATION DOCTRINE, DEPAR7'MENTOF
TRANSPORTA7'ION V. ASS'N OF AMERICAN RAILROADS. AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The so-called private and non-delegation doctrines have long
been considered moribund as a meaningful check on government
decisions to hand off sovereign powers to private parties. 449 Yet
just recently, in Department of Transportation u. Ass'n of American
Railroads,45o a faction of the Court signaled a willingness to
employ the private delegation doctrine to hold the government
accountable when it attempts to pass off powers to independent
entities. 451 Although not express in the Constitution, the concept
of government accountability emerges from Ass'n of American
Railroads as a galvanizing principle that is both embodied in the
Constitution's design and central to individual liberty.
The case involved Amtrak's preferential access to national rail
lines under the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act
of 2008 (PRIIA).452 In 1970, Congress created Amtrak' 53 as a
"~K The analysis is admittedly at odds with Burdeou [I. McDowell, 256 U.s. 465 (1921).
See supra notes 328-30 and accompanying text; see also Flagg Bros., Inc. Y. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149. 151-54. 163-64 (1978) ("[E)xpre.. [ing] no view as to the extent. if any. to which a
city or State might be free to delegate to private parties the performance of such functions
and thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
~ .111 Alexander Volokh argues that delegatIons are constitutional 80 long as the enacting
legislation contains an mtelligible principle. See Alexander Volokh, The New Priuate·
ReRulatwn Skepticism: Due Process, No,,~Delegation, and An.tilrusl Challenges, 37 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. POLty 931, 979 (2014) (arguing that the scarcity of cases where the Court has
struck down a statute on non-delegation grounds makes the doctrine useless for
constraining government delegation to private parties) .
... 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013). uacated, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2015).
M, I Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am . R.Rs., 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2015) .
.. n PasBenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, Div. B.
122 Stat. 4848, 4907 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 24101 note (2012», inualidated by ABo'n of Am.
R Rs. v. U.S. Dep't ofTran,p.• 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013). uacated. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2015) .
'" Ra il Passenger SerVIce Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 301. 84 Stat. 1327. 1330
(repealed 1994); see also Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep't of Transp., 865 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D.D.C.

G7(,
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"private, for-profit corporation" to save the passenger train
industry, which had suffered as a result of increased competition
from air travel and improved highway systems. 4'" Under the
statute, private railroads could transfer their unprofitable
passenger service to Amtrak but were required in exchange to
lease their tracks back to Amtrak, which would have preferred
access. 4;; Amtrak and the railroads subsequently entered into
operating agreements establishing rates that Amtrak would pay to
use the private tracks and facilities, as well as other conditions:l5fi
In 2008, Congress sought to standardize the operating
agreements by empowering Amtrak and the FRA to jointly
"develop new or improve existing metrics and minimum standards
for measuring the performance and service quality of intercity
passenger train operations, including ... on-time performance and
minutes of delay."457 Under the statute, if Amtrak and the FRA
cannot agree on metrics and standards, they can petition the
Surface Transportation Board (STB)-an independent agency
within the Department of Transportation-for binding
arbitration. 4." Moreover, "[t]o the extent practicable, Amtrak and
its host rail carriers [must] incorporate the metrics and
standards ... into their access and service agreements ...·'o" If
Amtrak fails to provide "on-time performance," the STB may start
an investigation to determine fault.'61l If it finds that a freight
carrier failed "to provide preference to Amtrak over freight
transportation as required," it can impose damages:";'

~1)]2). rella, 72 1 F.:id 666 (D.C. CIT. 2013), uarated, l:n H. Ct. 2355 (2015) (nntinl-:' tlmt tilt'
National Rail rruui Passenger Corporation is hetter knuwn m. Amtrak).
·IM Ass 'n of Am. R.Rs., R65 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (quoting Nat'} R.R. PasRenger Corp. v. Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Corp.• 470 U.S. 451, 454 (1985)); ,... 49 U.s,C. § 24:l01(OI).
•,e<, 49 U.S.C . § 24:108(u), (c).
·1511 A.~s'n of Am. R.Rs., 865 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
~ 57 49 U.S.C. § 24101 note; A.~"i'n of Am. R.Rs., 721 I·~.ad 666; Sf'C' Ml'lrk.o; & S/umlurcJs {or
Inl ercil;v Passenger Rail Serllicp Under Section 2tJ7 of the Passenger Rail JIII'C'~/ "U'/ll alld
Jm p I'(IfIC'melll Act of 2008, 75 }I'ed. Reg. 26,H39 (May 12, 2010) (f'xplaining that § !W7 of the
PRllA charged the FRA and Amtrak with developing new und impmving ('xiJ>ting mch·j(,s).
Stnmllirds were promulgated In 2010. Jd. (explaining that the FHA nnd Amtrak cl~yclop('d
new fltand ards that went into effect May I1t.h, 2UIU).
'" 49 U.RC. § 24101 note.
·\!',II Jd.
.; (1) Jd. § 24:U18(O(1). The S'rB must do so if Amtrak IIr a raih"luc1 bringR n complaint. fd.
'" Id. ~ 24:108(1)(2).
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Upset with Amtrak's enhanced powers, the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) initiated a lawsuit on behalf of its
freight railroad members, seeking an order declaring
unconstitutional the portion of the PRlIA giving Amtrak dual
authority to promulgate standards governing the freight rail
industry.462 Reversing the judgment of the district court, the D.C.
Circuit found that "Amtrak is a private corporation with respect to
Congress's power to delegate ... authority" and, as such, it cannot
be given the "regulatory power prescribed in [the PRlIA]" under
the private delegation doctrine. 46'
The Supreme Court reversed, deeming Amtrak a governmental
entity for purposes of the Constitution and remanding the case for
consideration, inter alia, of whether the PRlIA's provision for
appointment of an arbitrator " 'is a plain violation of the
nondelegation principle.' "464 Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy emphasized that "[t]reating Amtrak as governmental"
avoids what would otherwise amount to "an unbridled grant of
authority to an unaccountable actor."465 Among other things, "[t]he
political branches ... have imposed substantial transparency and
accountability mechanisms [on Amtrak], and, for all practical
purposes, set and supervise its annual budget."·66 Such" 'structural
principles secured by the separation of powers,' .. he added, " 'protect
the individual as well.' "461
Justices Alito and Thomas each wrote separately that the
PRlIA is unconstitutional under the private delegation doctrine.
Importantly, they both underscored the separation of powers
implications of privatized policymaking, which include, in Justice
Alito's words, "a vital constitutional principle [that] must not be
forgotten: Liberty requires accountability."468

.uling that the
:,p. v. Atchison,
(a).

Ass'n of Am . R.Rs., 721 F.3d at 670.
Jd. at 677.
Ifi\ D(!p't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 1335 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015). The Court also
instructed the D. C. Circuit to consider whether "Congress violated the Due Process Clause
by "givlingJ a fe derally chartered, nominally prlvate. for·profit corporation regulatory
aul hOl'ity over its own indu ~ try.''' Id. !<'or an explanation of the due process claim, see
4112

Standards {(Jr
and
It § 207 of the
:-lting metril!s).
,ruk devllinped
lIIes/menl

nplaint. [d.

Hi.1

supra nole a03 and accompanying text.
1M Ass'n of Am. R.Rs .• UJ35 S. Ct. at 1233.
U~; Jd.
·Ul7 ld. (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011».
161\ Jd. Ilt 12a4 (Alito, .J., (·oncurring).
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In making the case for why outsourcing powers to private
parties is unconstitutional, Justice Alito characterized
governmental power as uniquely belonging to government actors
who "are set apart from ordinary citizens. Because they exercise
greater power, they are subject to special restraints," such as
swearing an oath of office.'" Government actors, in turn, must be
accountable to the people. Otherwise, "[w]hen citizens cannot
readily identify the source of legislation or regulation that affect
their lives, Government officials can wield power without owning
up to the consequences," such as by "passing off a Government
operation as an independent private concern."470 Because "a
private person" can be appointed an arbitrator under the PRIIA,
Justice Alito concluded, "this law is unconstitutional."·7J
As support, Justice Alito cited the post-New Deal decisions in
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining, which have long been
dismissed by scholars as lifeless relics of the past. The nondelegation doctrine, he explained, "exists to protect liberty."472
"[B]y careful design," the structural Constitution "prescribes a
process for making law, [with]
many accountability
checkpoints."473 "It would dash the whole scheme," he quipped, "if
Congress could give its power away to an entity that is not
constrained by those checkpoints."474 Justice Alito maintained
leeway for preserving executive branch rulemaking even if private
Whereas "the other
sector lawmaking is unconstitutional.
branches of Government have vested powers of their own that can
be used in ways that resemble lawmaking," he explained, "(w]hen
it comes to private entities ... there is not even a fi g leaf of
constitutional justification."475
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas adopted a more rigidly
formalist approach to Article I that would "require that the
Federal Government create generally applicable rules of private
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conduct only through the constitutionally prescribed legislative
process."476 "Because a private entity is neither Congress, nor the
President or one of his agents, nor the Supreme Court or an
inferior court established by Congress," he added, "the Vesting
Clauses would categorically preclude it from exercising the
legislative, executive, or judicial powers of the Federal
Government."·77 But Justice Thomas ventured further than
Justice Alito to argue that Congress cannot allocate power to "an
ineligible entity, whether governmental or private."47. This view is
radical to the extent it would render unconstitutional vast swaths
of the federal administrative bureaucracy, leaving many segments
of the economy unregulated.
Like Justice Alito, Justice Thomas fastened his analysis on the
concept of government accountability,479 adding with irony that
"[wle never even glance at the Constitution to see what it says
about how this authority must be exercised and by whom"-a
searing insight regarding the way in which the privatization
movement (and, indeed, the growth of the administrative state)
has vastly outpaced the courts-and thus the law. 480 On this
point, Justice Thomas decried the Court as having "sanctioned the
growth of an administrative system that concentrates the power to
make laws ... in the hands of a vast and unaccountable
administrative apparatus that finds no comfortable home in our
constitutional structure."' ·'
Ass'n of American Railroads leaves at least two significant
constitutional issues for possible future consideration by the
Supreme Court. First, as the concurring opinions by Justices Alito
and Thomas indicate, the proposition that private delegations are
per se unconstitutional, is not yet well settled. The federal
government has repeatedly outsourced regulatory functions to

s," such as
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&e id. ut 1234 ("Confronted with 1\ stat\lte that authorizes a putativ~ly private mJ l r~1C' 1
participant to work hand·in-haud with an executive age ncy to craft rules that have lhl' fhn'tand effect of Jaw. our primary question . .. is whether that market participnnl, iN HllhJt'I:1 I;,
an adequate me8s ur~ of control by the Federal Government." Id. at 12-1U ('I'hHIII Il"'. •1 ,
concurring» .
... [d. at 1240.
'~I Id. at 1254 .
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private parties without meaningful constitutional checks, a
practice that reinvigoration of the private delegation doctrine
could call into question:'·"
Second, the case legitimates as doctrinally relevant the question
of whether the structural Constitution forbids delegations to
private parties that render the government democratically
If adopted, a doctrine of constitutional
unaccountable.
accountability could operate to confine the manner in which
outsourcing arrangements are structured-at least to the extent
that legislative power is involved. Such an approach would
advantageously adhere to the nondelegation doctrine's origins,
which derive from notions of popular sovereignty. John Locke"'"
explained that "the legislative cannot transfer the power of
making laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated power
from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others."48'
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly argued-in a concurring opinion
that condemned the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
as an impermissible delegation of broad agency authority to
establish exposure limits for carcinogens-that "the nondelegation
doctrine ... ensures to the extent consistent with orderly
governmental administration that important choices of social
policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most
responsive to the popular Will."4K5
Requiring that private
~K2 See Sarah Shlk l.umdnn. Sunshine For Sale: Enuironmental Contruc:lors Wid tll(!
Freedom of Information Act. 15 Vl'. J. ENV'I'L. L. I, ]6 (2014) ("As early n~ 1989, it waH
uncovered during &nat.e hl"anngs that EPA contr8ct.or~ were drafting budget riocuments.
overseeing field invel!ltigators, drafting re8pOnSeG to pubhc comments dur:ng the rulemaking'
process and Writing regulation preamblelJ, and organizlOg and conducting public hearings."
(quoting Steven J. Kl'iman. AC'hil'uing eon/rading Goals and Recognizing Pllbhr C(Jnrr.rll.'~:
A ContraclillR Management Perspective. in GOVF.RNMRNT 8Y CoNTRACT: OU1'HOURCING ANIl
At.mRlcAN DEM(Jt:H AGV. supra note 18, at 153. 177».
·Ilel l'(lck(! waR u pulitlcn] phiJcllmphcr whose ideas hl'uvily innucm:cd Uw I'-'rumen,. Sec

LlmNARD Wn.LIAMH J~ &VY, ORIGI NAl. INTENT AN I) Tnt: F1tAMF..H..t;,' CON~"'IT{ rr JO!'il 276 (19RB)
(d,~scrihmg

Lork,"!l vit·w or prullOrty 8M ('nCfllD}Jassing the "right to rights," including "the>
purMuit of hRppin~H'1.
~~, JOliN L()('KJ.;, 'fm: HI-:f:'ONJ) '1'RJ.;A'rl,s}o; O}o' GOVJmNM":N'r HI ('I'hmnnH P. Pl!llniull (~d., 'rJll~
(~ib,~rnJ Arts PreM, Inr.. 19i12) ( 1690).
·IM Indus. Union Ucp't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Gas(l), 44R U.s. 607, 685
(1980) (RchntJuist , J., concurring).
Rather than strike down the legJslatiun on
nondeJegntion grounds, the majority construed the statutory language narrowly to confine
agency discretion. Jd. at 639- 40. ('{ Loving y. Un ited States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996)
(observing thot "itlhc clear n .s~ il(Dment of power to a hranch ... allows the citiwn to know
who may he callt!<! to answer Cor making, or not makin g. thDtie delicate and necessary
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delegations be structured to retain accountability to the people
would serve the doctrine's purposes without unraveling the
administrative and contractual bureaucracies that are essential to
a functioning modern government.
Justice Thomas offered a two-part test for analyzing legislative
delegations: "The first step [would] be to classify the power that [a
statut'll purports to authorize" an entity other than Congress to
exercise.··h If that power includes the ability to give content to or
e!ecide the applicability of rules governing private conduct, the
fimt >ltep is satisfied." 7 ''The second step [would] be to determine
whnt.hur the Constitution's requirements for the exercise of that
power havn been satisfied."'HH For Justice Alito, this line might be
drawn at government actors who take an oath of office, whereas
Justice Thomas would find unconstitutional any legislation that
authorized the exercise of such power in a manner other than
bicameralism and presentment under Article I of the
Constitution:'"9
Common to both approaches under step two is a principle of
constitutional accountability, i.e., that the power of government
can only be exercised by actors who are accountable to the people
by virtue of a transparent process that the President can control.
Framed this way, constitutional accountability begins to take
e!octrinal shape. Suppose, once again, that DHS contractually
engages Booz Allen to develop bioterrorist protocols. This time,
the contract specifies that Booz Allen must draft rules that are
later incorporated into official agency guidelines, satisfying step
decision!'> (~sKential to governance" and stating that the nondeJegation doctrine "developed to
prevent Contr:ress from forsak ing its duties"); Arizona v, California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963)
(Harlan, .l., dissenting in part) ("The principle that authority granted by the legislature
mmolt he limitt'd hy Adequate standards, , . Insures that the fundamental policy decisions in
(ml' sodl'ty will he made not by an appointed official but by the body immediately
rmJlJOn8iblIJ to the people."); Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 26, at 254-55 (''Once the
peoph! hud delegated the lawmakmg power to the legislatul'C. it could pass no further lest it
(~ hllt(! thr pt'Opie's oversight."); CASS R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Ai,. Act UnoonslitutioMI?,98
MICH, I ~, Rfo:V. :ID3, 335-36 (1999) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine promotes "the
ki nrt of 1lI:I'tmnlnhilif.y t.hat romes (l'om requiring specific decisions from a deliberative body
l't~n('d inJ: thu vi ew!'! of l'elll'esentutlv('s from various s tates of the union').
'w, Dep',. of Transp. v. A.R'n of Am. R.Rs .• 1335 S. Ct. 1225. 1253 (2015) (Thorn ••••J..
eoncurrjn ~).
-.;H7

~"'ec
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411!1
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one of Justice Thomas's standard.
A public accountability
approach to private delegation would forbid this delegation
because it allows the government to evade responsibility for its
legislative functions under step two. The process is opaque and
not within the clear command of the President. A court employing
an accountability rationale might remand the case with
instructions to the government to amend the contract to include
terms that require transparent, comprehensive DHS review of the
proposed rules with the objective of fostering good government and
enabling public scrutiny of the rulemaking process.4 90 Optimally,
a functionalist approach to private delegation-grounded in
ensuring that the government remains accountable under the
Constitution without evading its protections via non-governmental
agents-might transfer to other doctrinal contexts in which futile
public-versus-private distinctions currently dominate.
D. CONFINING DATA INSOURCING AFTER RILEY V. CALIFORNIA

For the fIrst time in history, privately developed technology is
driving government surveillance"'! By insourcing data, the
government bootstraps the private sector's extra-constitutional
status for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and thereby evades
public accountability for surveillance derived from that data. This
is because, as with the state action doctrine, the Fourth
Amendment's third party doctrine bifurcates the public and
private spheres for purposes of triggering constitutional
protections, frustrating the Fourth Amendment objective of
maintaining a separation between the government and individual
zones of privacy.492 Much like the concept of constitutional
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plaintiff allege an underlying violation of individual constitutional rights.
<191 See Michaels. supra note 12, at 902 C'[T]he private sector('s] comparative advantage
over the government in acquiring vast amounts of potentially useful data is a function both
of industry's unparalleled access to the American public's intimate affairs-access given by
all those who rely on businesses to facilitate their personal, social, and economic
transactions-and of regulatory asymmetries insufar os private organizations can at times
obtain and share information more easi1y and under fewer legal restrictions than the
government can when it collects similar information on its own.").
·192 See supra Part IV.c.
Numerous scholars have thus argued for the third party
doctrine's retirement, offering various justifications within the confines of existing law.
E.g., Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection {or Shared Privacy
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accountability has infiltrated the Court's dialogue around private
delegation, however, the prerogative of maintaining an
accountable government appears in recent Fourth Amendment
cases as a constitutional value that may overshadow the historical
vagaries of existing doctrine in an era of ubiquitous big data
surveillance.
In United States u. Jones. 9a and Riley u. California,494 the
Supreme Court wrestled with the disconnect between the
permeating police surveillance made possible by new technologies
and outdated doctrinal barriers to Fourth Amendment scrutiny,
without overtly disturbing them. In both cases, the Court applied
the Fourth Amendment to constrain law enforcement's ability to
capitalize on the unprecedented surveillance capacity of today's
technology on the theory, articulated in Jones, that the Court
"must 'assur(e] preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.' "495 For its part, the unanimous Riley Court held that
the police may not search digital information on a cell phone
incident to arrest.496 Commentators have heralded Riley as a case
that "brings the Fourth Amendment into the digital age"497 and

climination of the third party doctrine on the theory that da ta is protected under Ka tZs
reasonable expectation of privacy test); Els peth A. Brotherton, Big Brother Gels a Makeover:
Behauioral Targeting and the Third.Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 592-96 (2012)
(discussing the proble ms with the third·party doctrine and arguing for the imposition of a
"competing-interests test"); Erik E. Hawkins, No Warrants Shall Issue But Upon Probable
Cause: The Impacl of the Slored Commrmicalions Act on Priuacy Expe('tations, 4 W AKE
FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 257, 270-73 (20 14) (discussing the need for an exceptio n to the third·
party doctrine in the in formation age); S tephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Curren.t) Fourth

Amendment: Protecting Th ird- Party Informa tion, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 975, 102 5 (2007) (advocating for the elimination of the strict third-party
doctrine a nd only applying it on a case-by-case basis). C{. Orin S. Kerr. The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 56 1. 600 (2009) C"The third party doctrine serves

ra live advantage
s a {unction both

two importa nt role s: blocking s ubstitution e ffects tbat upset the technological neutrality of
Fourth A me ndment law a nd furthe ring clarity of Fourth Amendment rules .").
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sets the stage for substantially reconfiguring the third party
doctrine. 49"
Like the D.C. Circuit's decision in Ass'n of American Railroads,
Riley is noteworthy for a different reason: the Court's overt
rejection of a "mechanical application" of Fourth Amendment
doctrine, which it conceded "might well support the warrantless
searches at issue."499 Instead, it took a functionalist approach to
restricting excessive government power, which focused on the
values underlying the Fourth Amendment. 50o Writing for the
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts first emphasized that the
"element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not
physical records" means greater surveillance power in the hands of
government. 50 I This is because ready government access to cell
phone data is quantitatively and qualitatively different than
physical searches of the past. 502 A cell phone search, he wrote,
would typically expose to the government far more
than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone
not only contains in digital form many sensitive
records previously found in the home; it also contains a
broad array of private information never found in a
home in any form-unless the phone is.503

408 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 249 1 (observing that a cell phone is unlike a storage cont.nin(!'r
as it "is used to access data located elsewhere," such as "on remote RPrvprs rnthpr t.han on

the device itself'),
4911 Id. at 2484.
In particular, the Court applied the search incident to afrest doctrine.
which requires assessment of... 'on the one hand, the degree to which fa wan'antlesa senrehl
intrudes upon an mdiV1dual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which It. is needed [01'
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.''' [d. (quoting Wyoming v. Huughton,
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999».
r.oo [d. at 2484-91; see Daniel J. Solove. Digital Dossiers and th(' /Ji:;sfpntioll uf ['iJl/rlll
Amendment Prioocy. 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2002) (proposing an "an:hilecture (]f
power" to balance government power with that of the people); see aL<;o KC'rr, .<;lIpm note :180,
at 802-04 & n.7 (citing numerous scholars for "the view that the Fourth Ampmimpnt. Hhcmld
be interpreted broadly in response to technological change").
t,(u Rile,v, 134 S. Ct.. at 2490.
r.n2 ld. at 2489-91.
foll:l Id. at 24 91. In this way, a search of a cell phone harkens hack to thp Tf'viled writ uf
assistance, "which were in essence open·ended search warrants, allowing officprs to sparc::h
any premises they chose," and were used by British authorities for decades until th(')'
expired in 1760 with the death of George II. James Otis, Against the Wnls of Assi:;/rwc'("
(1761), in 1 DOGUMl<;NTS Ojo' AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY: FROM TH K
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third party

Second, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the government
must be accountable for long-term, comprehensive monitorin g-by
whatever means achieved. To be sure, the third-party doctrine per
se was not before the Court because the existence of a search was
not in question. 5O ' Nonetheless, "[t)he United States concede[dl
that the search incident to arrest exception may not be stretched
to cover a search of files accessed remotely-that is, a search of
files stored in the cloud."6<J6 The Chief Justice likened the
government's access to the cloud via a cell phone to the search of a
house by virtue of "finding a key in a suspect's pocket."ou6 Surely,
he indicated, the latter would be intolerable under the Fourth
Amendment;607 the former is thus unthinkable, as well. In Riley,
cell phones' capacity to access data stored remotely-presumably
on private third-party servers-was thus held up as a reason for
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
There is a crucial distinction between the "cloud" for data
Htorage and an individual's private residence, however: the cloud
does not exist within the confines of a home. 'rbe government has
described a category of cloud infrastructures as "provisioned for
open use by the general public ... owned, managed and operated
by a business, academic, or government organization, or some
combination of them; and "exist[ing) on the premises of the cloud
provider."oos Under Smith v. Maryland,5og a colorable argument
can be made that a consumer's decision to store personal data on a
third-party cloud server operates as a waiver of Fourth
Amendment protections. 5lO Yet the public-private distinction-so
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central to Fourth Amendment doctrine to date-was missing from
the Riley opinion.
Lastly, Chief Justice Roberts underscored the overriding
purpose of the Fourth Amendment to justify the somewhat
extraordinary outcome in the case.
He characterized the
Founders' objective as a "response to the reviled 'general warrants'
and 'writs of assistance'" which were "driving forces behind the
Revolution itself."5ll Rejecting technical doctrinal distinctions in
favor of this broader principle, the Chief Justice insisted that
"[t]he fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such
information in his hand does not make the information any less
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought."·12 He
went so far as to mock the government's argument that it could
develop "protocols" to address cell phone access to cloud data,
retorting that it was "IP]robably a good idea, but the Founders did
not fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency
protocols ...•13
Chief Justice Roberts's reliance on first principles is
reminiscent of Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in Olmstead v.
United States, 51' in which the majority upheld warrantless
wiretapping of telephone conversations."ls Foreshadowing modern
surveillance technology, Justice Brandeis expressed concern that
"[w]ays may someday be developed by which the government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them
in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the
most intimate occurrences of the home," including "unexpressed
beliefs, thoughts and emotions."OI6
He posed the question
rhetorically, "Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection
against such invasions of individual security?"517 The answer to
such questions, he suggested, must lie "in giving effect to the
principle underlying the Fourth Amendment" and "refus[ing] to

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
Jd. at 2495.
613 ld. at 249 l.
6 14 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J. t dissenting); see Rotenberg & Butler, supra note
497 (discussing Justice Brandeis's veiled influence on the Riley opinion).
51' Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466-69.
&16 Id. at 474.
li17 Id.
MI

512
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place an unduly literal construction upon it."s1B Specifically, the
Framers "sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations" and thus
"conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."519 "To protect that right," he added, "every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment."s20
Big data mining enables the kind of unjustifiable intrusions on
privacy that Justice Brandeis envisioned. Before the age of big
data, technological limitations prevented intrusive surveillance
unless the government secured a warrant to search a home, an
order to wiretap, or both. s21 Chief Justice Roberts explained: "In
Riley's case, ... it is implausible that he would have strolled
around with video tapes, photo albums, and an address book all
crammed into his pockets" in the "pre· digital" era."22 The tracking
capacity of new technology creates dangers that exceed the
Founders' worst fears. 5~3 Yet the four corners of the third party
and public view doctrines render it technically beyond the Fourth
Amendment's strictures. Recognizing this irony, the Riley Court
echoed Justice Brandeis's admonition that underlying
constitutional principles must override narrower interpretations if
citizens are to be protected from government overreaching."24
In her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, Justice
Sotomayor suggested that constitutional accountability is one such
Id. al 476.
Id. at 478. Justice Brandeis distinguished Burdeau II. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921),
on the grounds that
[llhere only a single lot of papers was involved. They had been obtained by
a private detective while acting on behalf of a private party. without the
knowledge of any federal official. long before anyone had thought of
instituting 8 federal prosecution. Here the evidence ... was obtained at the
government's expense, by its officers, while acting on its behalf.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 481-82.
~2U Olmslead, 277 U.S. at 478-79.
&21 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (noting that in the pre-computer
age. surveillance was di fficult and costly).
'" Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
ft2., See. Ld. a t 2495 (noting that technological adva nces do not make per~onal information
unworthy of the protection for which the Founders fought).
6~' ld. at 2493.
~III

11111
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principle. 525 While modern surveillance affords the government
unprecedented access to personal information, she argued, it is
accompanied by an unprecedented lack of accountability.SZ!; Jones
involved installation of a global positioning system (GPS) on an
automobile for tracking purposes.627 Concurring in the majority's
finding that law enforcement's use of the GPS constituted a Fourth
Amendment search, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that today's
technology "is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously," thereby
"evad[ing] the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and community
hostility.' "528 She underscored the Constitution's role in ensuring
that the government's capacity for surveillance is curtailed:
"Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government's
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of
identity is susceptible to abuse."529 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor
warned, "[t]he Government can store [these] records and efficiently
mine them for information years into the future."53o The
consequence of "making available at a relatively low cost Buch a
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to
track," Justice Sotomayor observed, is that modern surveillance
technology "may 'alter the relationship between citizen and
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.' "531
As in the state action context, a constitutional accountability
principle could be applied in Fourth Amendment cases to confine
how the government structures the processes by which it insources
and uses third-party data. Requiring a warrant every time the
government utilizes third-party data is not feas ible. But the
r.26 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 966 (Sotomayor, J. t concurring) «('om:;idering th(· }<'llllrth
Amendment's goa l "to curb arbitrary exercise of police power").
[,26 See id. (noting that "the Government's unres trained power tu HAsemhlp ... I)rivah!
nspects of identity is s usce ptible to abusp"),
521 Id. at 947-49 (majorlty opinion).
"28 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 5,10 U.H. ·119, 426 (~()()4» ,
l'>Z!J
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Id. at 9 55-56 (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 6 17 1<~. 3d 1120, 1 . ~4 (9th Cir.
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from thE> denia l of rE'hc nring pn hane)).
r.:l l Id. a t 956 «llInt.ing Un ited States v. CUPv8s·Pprez, 640 I·'.ad 272, ~HI'1 (7th ('ir. :U)1 1)
(Flaum, J., concurring».
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structural Constitution might be imposed to force the government
to enact and follow protocols that protect individual privacy and
ensure sufficient public oversight when it conducts big data
searches without a warrant. 632
Suppose, for example, that by mining publicly-available data
and matching it with information contained in government
databases (such as satellite and closed circuit video data), the NSA
learns that Janet Schmendrick has interacted with an individual
who is suspected of having ties to a member of the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As a consequence, the NSA begins watching
Janet's every move. The NSA's ability to track Janet using
information she willingly posted on the Internet or provided to
commercial third parties, as well as any images obtained as a
result of her movement in public spaces, might not trigger Fourth
Amendment protections under current doctrine. Yet, assuming
arguendo that Janet could satisfy constitutional standing, a public
accountability approach to the Fourth Amendment might give rise
to an injunction requiring lesser privacy protection measures as a
matter of constitutional necessity. Under the Riley Court's
functionalist approach to technology and the Fourth Amendment,
the effect of the government's big data usage--omnipresent
surveillance reminiscent of a general warrant-would itself justify
application of constitutional limits, regardless of the private status
of the entities that sourced the data in the first place.
To be sure, this Article does not make specific recommendations
other than to posit that a plaintiff suing the NSA over its data
collection efforts might seek a range of injunctive relief on a public
accountability theory that appropriately balances law enforcement
and national security interests with individual privacy protections.
Such protections might include imposition of consent protocols:
transparlmcy requirements; limits on wide-scale collection,
retention, use and sharing of data; methods for ensuring the
accuracy, relevance, and completeness of data used for
governmental purposes; and the establishment of security
safeguards against the risk of loss or unauthorized US(1.

H. ·11».4 26 (2004».
120, 1124 (9th Cir.

2H5 (7th Ctr. 20 \ 1)

6.12 'I'hese could cotnp. in the form of I ~gi818ti ve amennnwnts to existing data·in80urcing
related Rtaluh·s. fl('f.> Ii"pm Part III.B, ur through infhrmal or eVl'l1 llf)u·leglsintiw l"Ulemaking.
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destruction, modification, or disclosure of data. 633 In any event, a
public accountability gloss on the Fourth Amendment would afford
a more nuanced-and potentially more comprehensive-approach
to the challenges of modern surveillance methods than do
legislative options, which leave constitutional privacy interests
vulnerable. Applying a constitutional accountability principle to
reconcile modern technology with existing Fourth Amendment
doctrine would also chip a way at the unhelpful pretense that the
public and the private spheres are functionally distinct for
purposes of constitutional law.
VI. CONCLUSION

The private sector's development of massive data banks,
biometric technology, and unprecedented online monitoring
diminishes the need for the government to extract information
from individuals on its own. The result is an end-run around the
constitutional limits on the government's surveillance abilities.
This Article drew parallels between the government's use of
private data to perform surveillance on the one hand, and its use
of private parties to perform its constitutional functions through
outsourcing on the other. The net effect of both phenomena is a
marginalization of the Constitution's role in protecting
fundamental guarantees. Private entities hold the reins on
surveillance technology for the first time in history, and they are
driving society towards the Orwellian state that research shows
many Americans fear.
This reconfiguration of the Const itution's impact on protecting
privacy from governmental intrusion is not a result of careful
theoretical analysis by the Supreme Court, the President or
Congress regarding the government's constitutional obligations
when it acts in partnership with the private sector. It is a product
of outdated constitutional case law in the form of the Fourth
/1:1."1 See C HRI STOPHER SU1BOGlN, PRIVACY A't' RINK: THF. NJ~W GOVlmNM f.:NT RURVF.JJ.I.ANCF.
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 74-76 (2007) (proposing modifications of Title III to make
the provisions applicable to visual Jliurveillnnce); THE W HITE HOUSE. CONSUMER DATA
PJu VA~'Y IN A N ETWORKED WORW: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRO'I'EC'l'INO PRJVACY ANn
PROMOTING I NNOVATION IN THE GLOBAl. DIGITAL ECONOMY 1-10 (201 2). auailable at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/sitesldefaultlfiles/privacy finn1.pdf (proposing a consumer privacy bill
o

of r ights).
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Amendment's third-party doctrine, the state action doctrine, and
the private delegation doctrine. The constitutional blind spot
created by the government's reliance on the private sector for its
own functions can, however, be addressed through a reframing of
existing doctrine in ways that show fidelity to the preservation of
government accountability under the structural Constitution.

